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ARTICLE

Does International Human Rights Law in
African Courts Make a Difference?
DANIEL ABEBE

Is international human rights law effective in Africa? Extant studies assess
effectiveness by focusing on the potential of individualAfrican regional and sub-regional
courts to promote human rights and influence domestic actors. Howeverfew f any studies
actually evaluate the entire human rzghtsjurisprudence of the five major African courts
withjurisdictionto hearhuman rights claims. In this Article, I examine the entire human
rights caseloadof these courtsfrom 1988 through 2015 alongfour important dimensions
of effectiveness: (1) court structure; (2) volume of cases; (3) compliance rate; and (4)
funding andindependence. The Articlefinds thatAfrican regionaland sub-regionalcourts
are facing significant challenges as they struggle with structural deficiencies, meager
caseloads, low compliance rates, andpersistent budgetary issues. The Article then describes
the institutional, procedural, and operational challenges that limit the effectiveness of
African regionaland sub-regionalcourts and concludes that, based on a case-specific model
of effectiveness, much improvement is necessary before the courts can become effective in
vindicating human rights claims.
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INTRODUCTION

Most scholars of international law are familiar with the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights or the African Court on Human
and Peoples' Rights. The Economic Community of West African States
Community Court ofJustice, the East African Court ofJustice, and the South
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African Development Community Tribunal, for example, are commonly
known as well. But many will be surprised to hear that all of these regional
and sub-regional adjudicatory bodies have jurisdiction to hear human rights
claims for violations of regional and international treaties, that they have
active caseloads, and that African states implement their judgments.' On a
continent with such a poor human rights record, these courts look promising
and have the potential to play a key role in adjudicating human rights claims
and providing relief for the many victims of human rights violations.
The current trends seem positive as well. In 2015 alone, the African
Union ("AU") established in Senegal the Extraordinary African Chambers for
the Trial of Hissen Habre, the former Chadian dictator, who was subsequently
2
convicted of war crimes. The AU also granted the new African Court of
Justice and Human Rights criminal jurisdiction over more international crimes
3
than even the International Criminal Court had under its broad mandate.
Between the AU's recent attention to human rights and the rise of an African
regional court system, it appears that Africa has finally committed itself to
enforcing international human rights law.
In fact, the general proliferation of African regional and sub-regional
courts, 4 the new willingness of African economic and trade courts to exercise
5
jurisdiction over human rights claims, and the human rights guarantees
6
articulated in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights are all
indicative of the increasing acceptance of courts as the proper forum for
7
redressing human rights violations. As the human rights caseload of African

1. See generaly KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,

RIGHTS (2014).
2. See Dionne Searcey, Hissene Habri, Ex-President of Chad, Is Convicted of War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,

(May 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/

2

016/05/31/world/africa/hissene-habre-leader-chad-war-

crimes.html?_r=0.
3.,Qe'rA: The Case of Hissene labriBefore the ExtraordinaryAfrican Chambers in Senegal,

Hu

RIGHTS

WATCH (May 3, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissene-habreextraordinary-african-chabers-senegal; see Kristen Rau, JrsprudentialInnovationor Accountabity Avoidance?
The InternationalCriminal Court and Proposed Expansion of the African Court ofJustice and Human Rghts, 97

MINN. L. REv. 669, 708 (2012); infra notes 288-93.
4. See Lucyline Nkatha Murungi & Jacqui Gallinetti, The Role of Sub-Regional Courts in the Aican
Human Rights System, 7 INT'LJ. HUM. RTS. 119 (2010) (outlining the development of regional courts in

Africa).
5. See Karen

J. Alter,

Laurence R. Helfer & Jacqueline R. McAllister, A New InternationalHuman

Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (2013)
(explaining the rise of the ECOWAS Court as a human rights court).

6. See generally African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(hereinafter Banjul Charter); U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM.

J.

INT'L L. 902 (1983).
7. See Alter et al., supra note 5; James Gathii, Mission Creep or a Searchfor Relevance: The East African
Court of Justice's Human Raghts Strategy, 24 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 249 (2014) (describing the EACJ's
role as a human rights body).
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regional courts increases, 8 optimism about the impact of these courts is
growing. For one prominent scholar, "human rights litigation in the [East
African Court ofJustice] is part of a broader strategy of political mobilization
that is giving voice to actors who did not have such legal recourse to advance
their claims in the past." 9
But for others, this picture is not as rosy. Scholars have identified the
many weaknesses of the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights
and the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights - the two most
important regional human rights bodies in Africa
by outlining their
procedural deficiencies and, most importantly, the lack of state compliance
with these human rights bodies.' 0 Others have pointed out that African
regional courts struggle to operate due to lack of funding and staff" and that
the judiciaries of African states are rarely aware of the decisions of regional
and sub-regional courts. 12 Additionally, after the South African Development
Community Tribunal issued a series of judgments condemning Zimbabwe for
its human rights violations, the Tribunal's member states stripped it of its
human rights jurisdiction altogether.13
Things are not much better at the AU. While the AU's new African Court
of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) has broad criminal jurisdiction,' 4 it
also provides African leaders and senior officials immunity from prosecution
for human rights violations as long as they are in power.' 5 This policy thus
gives those accused of human rights violations the incentive to serve as
"President for life." Some are also suspicious of the AU's motivation in
granting the ACJHR such a broad mandate, with some speculating that this is
an attempt to weaken the International Criminal Court and ensure that if
African leaders are tried at all, it will be in an African rather than a foreign
court.16
8. See generaly ALTER, supra note 1.
9. Gathii, supra note 7, at 296.
10. This is discussed at length in Sections II and 1H.
11. Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court: A Needful
Duality or a Needless Duplication?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811, 870 (2003).
12. RACHEL MURRAY & DEBRA LONG, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
AFRICAN COMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 74 (2015).
13 . See Catherine Sasman, SADC Leaders Neuter Tribunal, NAMIBIAN (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201208220540.html, Cleophas Tsokodayi, SADC TribunalDecisionsNulland
Void, EXAMINER (May 18, 2011), http://www.exaniner.com/article/sadc-tribunal-decisions-nul-andvoid-justice-ministers.
14. The Present and Potential Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the ACIPR, PROJECT ARC (ADVICE,
REPRESENTATION AND CASES), http://arcproject.co.uk/201 2 /0 2 /the-present-and-potential-subjectmatter-jurisdiction-of-the-afchpr/; see also infra notes 288-93.
15. Sarah Logan, Africa's Step Backwardin InternationalLaw,WORLD POL'Y BLOG (July 24, 2014, 8:48
AM), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/201 4 /0 7 / 2 4 /afticas-step-backward-internatonal-law.
16. Max du Plessis, Shamboli, Shameful and Symbolic: Implications of the African Union's Immunity for
African Leaders, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., Nov. 2014, at 3, https://www.issaftica.org/uploads/
Paper278.pdf.
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How do we reconcile these two competing narratives about the African
regional and sub-regional court system? Is this system effective in vindicating
human rights claims? If so, how? If not, what are its prospects? One strand
in the literature on the effectiveness of international courts focuses on the
17
ability of a court to influence states subject to its jurisdiction, empower

9
8
domestic actors,' or develop international law through its jurisprudence.'
Building on these criteria of effectiveness, scholarship on the African court
system generally focuses on in-depth case studies concerning the role of sub20
the impact of particular
regional courts in promoting human rights,
domestic actors, 21 and
African
on
decisions by sub-regional courts
mechanisms to improve the relationship between African national judiciaries
22
and international courts. While the literature on African courts certainly
sheds light on the influence of individual courts in specific regions, it does not

provide a broader evaluation of the entire African court system. In contrast,
the approach employed in this Article focuses on the total volume of cases
and level of state compliance with human rights decisions. A broader
evaluation is not only key to measuring effectiveness but is also instrumental
to assessing the role of legal decisions as a key mechanism to influence state
actors to improve human rights practices. In other words, the effectiveness
of the African court system rests in significant part on the adjudication of
human rights decisions, which vindicate human rights claims and signal the
court's willingness to hold states accountable.
To fill this gap in the literature, this Article provides perhaps the first
comprehensive examination of the effectiveness of human rights
jurisprudence in the entire African regional and sub-regional court system.
This Article employs a case-specific model of assessing effectiveness by
focusing on four salient dimensions that are common in the international law
literature: (1) court structure; (2) volume of cases; (3) compliance rate; and (4)
funding and independence. To make this assessment, I have reviewed the
entire caseload of international human rights claims available in the African

17. YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 423-26

(2014).
18. Shaley Roisman, ConstrainingStates: ConstitutionalLessonsfor InternationalCourts, 55 VA. J. INT'L L.

729, 780 (2015).
19. Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of InternationalLaw in the Jurisprudence of H.LA. Hart, 21 EUR.J.

INT'L L. 967 (2010).
20. Laurence Boulle, Pmmoting Rights Through Court-BasedADR?, 28 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 1, 17 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Matthew Scott & Leigh Swigart, InternationalCourts, LocalActors, BRANDEIS INST. FOR

INT'L JUDGES 2015, (Linda Carter et al. eds., 2015), https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/
2
internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ 015.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Michelle Gehrig, InternationalCourts andthe Domesticjudidaryin Africa, E-INT'1L REL. (Jan.
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/19/international-courts-and-the-domestic-judiciary-in2012),
19,
africa/.
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Human Rights Case Law Analyser, 23 a database maintained and operated by
the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, 24 over the last
twenty-seven years. This database includes cases drawn from what I describe
as the "African court system:" the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the
Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice,
the East African Court of Justice, and the South African Development
Community Tribunal. In addition, I have assembled qualitative data on state
compliance with African court system judgments and quantitative data on the
budgets and funding sources for each of the five courts. Using a case-specific
approach to assessing effectiveness, this study suggests that the African court
system is struggling to function as an effective adjudicator of human rights
claims.
For Africa, with its poor human rights record and population of over 1.1
billion, the caseload of international human rights claims across the African
court system totaled 337 cases. 25 Of these, only 113 resulted in a judgment
finding a violation of a regional or international human rights treaty. 26
Relatively few of these 113 judgments were actually enforced, and according
to available data, state compliance rates are poor.27 Every court in the African
court system - with the exception of one - substantially relies on foreign
donors to operate, making it difficult for the African court system to
demonstrate its independence and establish legal authority. 28 Although the
results of this study show an African court system that faces significant
structural, financial, and practical challenges, the study does not conclude that
the African court system cannot, over time, become a more effective venue
for human rights claims, or that other approaches to assessing effectiveness
might produce different results. The study simply shows how the wellrecognized, case-specific model of effectiveness reveals that the African court
system is struggling.
Section I briefly reviews the competing methodologies on assessing the
effectiveness of international courts. Section II describes the structure and
operation of the African court system and presents data on its caseload, usage,
state compliance rate, and funding. Section III evaluates the results of Section
II and considers potential critiques, alternative hypotheses, confounding
variables, and measurement issues. Section IV discusses normative proposals
to improve the African court system and provides some concluding thoughts.
23. See generalyAfrican Human Rights Case LawAnayser, INST. FoR HUMAN RIGHTS & DEv. IN AFR.,

http://caselaw.ibrda.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).

24. See generaly INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS DEv. IN AFR., http://www.ihrda.org/ (last visited Feb. 18,

2016).
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra notes 113-118.
Id.
Id
See infra Section II(D).
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THEORIES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL COURTS

The literature on the effectiveness of international courts is vast and
includes

both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Yet there is no

dominant understanding of the best methodology to measure the impact of
international courts on the parties, states, and other actors subject to the
courts' authority. The key issue for all of these approaches is the difficulty in
the
demonstrating a causal relationship between the court's activities legal
judgments,
formal
programming,
potential,
catalytic
court's presence,
and human rights outcomes. Before
reasoning, advisory opinions evaluating the data on the African court system, the discussion below outlines
the competing approaches to assessing the effectiveness of international
courts.
As Laurence Helfer details in a recent article, 29 the range of
methodological approaches to measuring the effectiveness of international
courts ("ICs") can be divided into four categories: (1) case-specific
effectiveness; (2) erga omnes effectiveness; (3) embeddedness effectiveness; (4)
30
and norm-development effectiveness. He carefully describes their strengths
and weaknesses and outlines the type of research questions common to each
methodology. 3 1 The merits of the four methodologies are worth exploring to
determine their relevance for assessing the African court system.
Case-specific effectiveness focuses on "whether a state found in breach
32
of international law changed its behavior following an IC judgment." It is
perhaps the simplest, most intuitive approach to measuring effectiveness: an
IC that works well is one that, through domestic actors at the state level,
compels the relevant parties to comply with its judgments. As discussed
33
below, Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter are proponents of this approach.
Erga omnes effectiveness examines "whether ICs are effective in
34
influencing the behavior of all actors subject to their authority." Scholars
working from this perspective are concerned not only with the ex post
behavior of the parties in a given case but also with the behavior of all states
35
subject to the jurisdiction and authority of the IC. There are two prominent
strands of erga omnes effectiveness: One employs "quantitative empirical
methods to analyze the behavior of governments, both as policymakers and
29. Laurence R. Helfer, The Effecliveness of InternationalAdjudicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464 (Karen J. Alter, Cesare Romano & Yuval Shany eds., 2014).

30. Id. at 466.
31. Id. at 466-81.
32. Id. at 466.
33. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory ofEffective SupranationalAdjudication,

107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
34. Helfer, supra note 29, at 472.
35. Id.
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as prospective litigants," 36 with the goal of measuring the effect of the IC on
a broad range of relevant constituencies. 37 The second moves from the
positive to the normative, offering proposals regarding the institutional design
of ICs and the adoption of particular procedures to broaden an IC's erga omnes
effectiveness. 38 In the end, the erga omnes methodology assesses effectiveness
in part by evaluating the expost behavior of all parties, particularly states, after
an adverse judgment from an IC.
Embeddedness effectiveness explores "whether ICs enhance the ability
of domestic actors to prevent or remedy violations of international rules 'at
home,' thus avoiding the need for international litigation." 39 Scholars working
in this vein look to the mechanisms through which ICs can incentivize
domestic actors, largely through "institutional design features, most notably
jurisdiction and access rules." 40 Much like erga omnes effectiveness, this
approach has both positive and normative components but is much less
focused on specific case outcomes or implementation.
Finally, norm-development effectiveness focuses on "how IC decisions
contribute to building a body of international jurisprudence." 41 Here, an IC's
effectiveness is a function of the quality of its legal reasoning when
interpreting and applying international law. When judges at an IC display their
legal acumen by issuing innovative judgments or developing a strong
reputation, the IC increases its capacity to "promote the underlying objectives
of the legal obligations that the court supervises." 42 This approach is casedriven, as it requires close attention to the development of an IC's
jurisprudence in both specialized ICs - such as human rights courts - and
ICs with general jurisdiction.
Each methodology has its merits, and this Article does not attempt to
resolve the debate about the best approach to analyzing the effectiveness of
international human rights courts. In fact, multiple studies from different
perspectives only improve our knowledge of the mechanisms through which
courts affect outcomes on the ground. What is clear, however, is that three of
the four approaches view cases as key tools to motivate domestic actors and
incentivize states to change their behavior. Moreover, in light of the
availability of data on caseloads, adverse judgments, and implementation, the
case-specific approach to assessing IC effectiveness is the most
straightforward of the dominant methodologies. The approach is not perfect,
36. Id. at 473.
37. Id.
38. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The EmpiricalTurn in InternationalLegal Scholarship, 106 AM.J.

INT'L L. 1, 16-19 (2012).
39. Helfer, supra note 29, at 474.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 466.
42. Id. at 478.
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but it provides a useful set of variables to evaluate the effectiveness of the
African court system.
A. Case-Specific Effectiveness
Measures for Effectiveness: Helfer and Slaughter offer a well-developed
theory of case-specific effectiveness. For them, the definition of effectiveness
43
is a "court's basic ability to compel or cajole compliance with its judgments."
They begin by comparing and contrasting domestic and international courts.
In domestic courts, effectiveness is the power to compel a defendant to
become a party to a dispute and to "comply with the resulting judgment."44
Domestic courts are also effective when their ability to compel a litigant to
comply post-trial encourages similarly situated parties to comply in the face
5

4
of future litigation.
For ICs and international adjudicators, effectiveness is not a binary
determination; rather, it "requires locating courts along a continuum of
effectiveness." 46 Since ICs lack the coercive capacity to make parties to a suit
comply with their judgments - or even to appear before them - ICs are
substantially less effective than is the typical, well-functioning domestic
court. 47 Given the weakness of ICs, their effectiveness turns on state interests
in complying with the IC's judgments, the legitimacy of the IC and its
48
jurisprudence, and the salience of the underlying legal rule at issue. Yet,
despite the differences between domestic courts and ICs, Helfer and
Slaughter employ the same definition of effectiveness for both types of
courts, namely the ability of each "to compel compliance with its judgments
by convincing domestic government institutions, directly and through
49
pressure from private litigants, to use their power on its behalf."

B. Effectiveness and Compliance
Other scholars also consider cases and state compliance in assessing the
effectiveness of ICs. Although they differ from Helfer and Slaughter in their
general approach to ICs, Eric Posner and John Yoo agree that "[a] tribunal is
50
effective if states comply with its judgments." They outline three potential
43. Helfer & Slaughter, stpra note 33, at 278.
44. Id at 283.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 290.
50. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judcial Independence in InternationalTribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1,
28 (2005).
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measures for effectiveness including (1) the level of state compliance with IC
judgments; (2) the caseload or usage of the IC; and (3) the overall efficacy of
the treaty regime that created the IC.51 The most straightforward measure is
state compliance. Consistent with the case-specific approach, they contend,
ICs "can be effective only if the state that loses is (usually) willing to comply
with the judgment." 52 The easiest way to assess state compliance is through
determining the IC's compliance rate, namely "the number of complied-with
judgments divided by the total number of judgments." 53
Even if defining compliance appears relatively easy, Posner and Yoo
acknowledge that measuring compliance is more complicated. For example,
state compliance is often difficult to observe or interpret, meaning that it
could be total, partial, or mixed for any given judgment. 54 Compliance also
has a temporal component - is it true compliance if a state finally complies
with a judgment many years after it has been handed down?55 Evaluating state
implementation is also susceptible to selection effects, where the nature of
the disputes that individuals or states choose to submit to ICs might distort
the compliance rate. 56
Posner and Yoo's second measure of effectiveness is usage or volume of
cases. They argue that "[i]f a tribunal is ineffective, states will stop using it."s?
Accordingly, a more effective court will likely see a greater caseload. Metrics
for measuring usage include the number of states using the IC, the number
of cases, the number of cases per year, and the number of cases per state per
year. 58 But, like measurements of compliance, selection effects present
problems since a variety of disputes might be justiciable in multiple ICs. 59 If
so, states and other litigants might choose the most relevant court rather than
the most effective one. Finally, one could also assess IC effectiveness by
examining whether the underlying situation improves, worsens, or stagnates
in the relevant states or region within a specific IC's jurisdiction, or in the area
of international law that an IC is meant to address. 60 Such an ex post facto
analysis, however, is only reliable when all else is equal, making it extremely
difficult to isolate the independent effect of the IC from competing
explanatory variables.61
51. Id at 27-29.
52. Id at 20.
53. Id at 28.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id

2016]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICAN COURTS

537

It is well beyond the scope of this Article (and the available data) to assess
the effectiveness of the African court system using each of the four

approaches

outlined

here.

Like

other

quantitative

and

qualitative

methodologies, each has strengths and weaknesses. This Article does not

attempt to resolve the debate on the proper measures for assessing the
effectiveness of an IC. However, to make some progress in understanding the
effectiveness of the African court system and exploit the available data on
African court system data, I adopt some of the key variables common to the
case-specific approaches outlined in this section, and I apply them to the data
described below. 62 In the following section, I examine the institutional
structure, usage, compliance rate, and independence (measured through
funding) of the African court system. Although consideration of these factors
will not capture every possible way in which an IC might be effective, doing
so will provide greater context on the operation and effectiveness of the
African court system and will help in evaluating normative proposals to
improve the system's functioning.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL COURTS
A. Background on African Regionaland Sub-Regional Courts
Any assessment of human rights litigation and its effectiveness in Africa
starts with an examination of the African regional and sub-regional courts that
have specific jurisdiction to hear human rights claims. This study thus focuses
on the operation of the five African regional and sub-regional courts (the
"African court system") that have such jurisdiction: the African Commission
63
the African Court on
on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACommHPR"),
64
Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACourtHPR"), the Court of Justice of the
65
Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS Court"), the
62. Infra Section II(B)(l).
63. The ACommHPR is a quasi-judicial body founded in 1987 and located in Banjul, Gambia. It
has eleven commissioners serving for six-year terms, and they are eligible for reelection by the assembly
of the African Union. The ACommHPR meets twice per year and has jurisdiction over fifty-three of the
member states of the AU, with only South Sudan not yet under its mandate. See generally Banjul Charter,
supra note 6; Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five-Year Reort

andAssessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43 (1992).
64. The ACourtHPR was founded in 2004 and is located in Arusha, Tanzania. It consists of a
tribunal of eleven judges serving for four or six-year terms and eligible for reelection by the assembly of
the African Union. It has jurisdiction over twenty-seven of the member states of the African Union, with
a large portion of AU states not having ratified the ACourtHPR Protocol. See generally Nsongurua J.
Udombana, Toward theAfrican Court on Human and Peoples'Rights: Better Late than Never, 3 YAL-E HUM. RTS.
& DLV. L.J. 45 (2000); Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rsghts, July 1, 2008, 48

I.L.M. 337.
65. The ECOWAS Court was founded in 1991 and is located in Abuja, Nigeria. It consists of a
tribunal of seven judges, appointed by the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS members, for
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Southern African Development Community Tribunal ("SADCT"),66 and the
East African Court of Justice ("EACJ").67 These five adjudicatory bodies
one quasi-judicial regional commission, one regional court, and three subregional courts - do not represent the entirety of courts in Africa. However,
most importantly, each has jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights claims. 68
Of course, there are many other African sub-regional courts that may be
granted or might assume jurisdiction over human rights claims in the future.
The Court of Justice of the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community, the Instance Judiciare of the Arab Maghreb Union, and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Court ofJustice hear cases
within their respective jurisdictions, but they do not exercise jurisdiction over
human rights claims and are not included in my dataset.69 Since some ICs with
jurisdiction over claims of human rights violations that occur in Africa are not
actually part of the African court system, I have also excluded these from my
dataset. These ICs include the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, and the new Extraordinary African Chambers for the Trial of Hissen
Habre. 70 Finally, national courts that exercise universal jurisdiction or hear
human rights claims under domestic law are also excluded for the same
reason. By narrowly focusing on the African regional and sub-regional courts
with jurisdiction over human rights claims, this study can draw more accurate
five-year terms. Judges are eligible for reappointment once, and the ECOWAS Court has jurisdiction
over all fifteen members of ECOWAS. See generaly Economic Community of West African States Community

Court offustice (ECOWAS) Redsed Treaty, July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 [hereinafter ECOWAS]; Alter et al.,

sepra note 5.
66. The SADCT was founded in 1992 and was located in Windhoek, Namibia. It consisted of a
tribunal of ten members and met approximately five times per year. It had jurisdiction over all fifteen
members of the South African Development Community ("SADC'). The SADCT was effectively
suspended in 2012 and reorganized, with jurisdiction limited to "disputes between member states" rather
than adjudicating claims from individuals. See generalyWerner Scholtz, Review ofthe Role, Functions andTerms

ofReference ofthe SADC Tribunal, 1 S. AFR. DEv. COMMUNITY L.J. 197 (2011).
67. The EACJ was founded in 1999 and is based in Arusba, Tanzania. It consists of a tribunal of
ten judges, divided between a first instance and an appellate division, each serving a single seven-year
term. It has jurisdiction over all five members of the EAC. See generally Gathii, supra note 7; E. AFR. CT.
J., http://eacj.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
68. Of course, each adjudicatory body employs different procedures, and the underlying law that is
applied sometimes varies between courts. See, e.g., Banjul Charter, supra note 6; E. AFR. CT.J., supra note
67; ECO WAS, supra note 65; Protocolon the Statute of the African Court, supra note 64. To better understand
the overall performance of the African court system, the cases from each court are combined into one
dataset with the hope that it provides a broader perspective on the utility of human rights law in the
region as a whole.
69. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Court of Justice, INT'L JUSTICE RES.
CTR.,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional-communities/common-market-for-eastem-and-southern-africacourt-of-justice/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
70. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: Lltgating the Hybrid Rsght to Freedom
ofMovement (Danish Nat'l Research Found.'s Centre of Excellence for Int'l Cts., Working Paper No. 32,
2015),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6208&context=faculty
scholarship.
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conclusions about the relationship between adjudicated cases and human
rights outcomes.
1.

The HistoU of the African Court System

A full understanding of the history, political environment, and
institutional setting in which each regional and sub-regional court operates
would provide helpful context for this study. Yet, of course, such a
comprehensive examination is beyond the scope of this Article. This section
offers a very brief summary of the key institutional actors involved in creating
five regional and sub-regional courts that comprise the African court system.
In 1986, the Organization of African Unity ("OAU"), the predecessor of
the AU, approved the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
"Charter") and created the ACommHPR, which formally came into existence
in 1987.71 Reporting directly to the Assembly of the AU since 2000, the
ACommHPR has the largest caseload and broadest membership, and it had
the most expansive human rights jurisdiction during the relevant time period.
The OAU created the Charter and the ACommHPR to embody the "values,
72
traditions, and development of Africa." Indeed, the OAU wanted to create
a "conception of human rights" and "pattern [of] the African philosophy of
73
law [that met] the needs of Africa." The Charter was a significant milestone
for Africa because human rights had not been a priority of the OAU or its
member states in the years prior to 1986.74
In fact, at the time of its founding in 1963, the OAU's primary mission
was promoting "political and economic independence, non-discrimination
and the liberation of Africa eradication of colonialism on the continent."
However, the OAU did not focus on protecting civil liberties. 75 For example,
the OAU did not have an adjudicatory mechanism to hear individual rights
claims between individuals and states. While the OAU did not make civil,
political or economic rights a priority, it did initiate preliminary discussions
76
that over time developed into a program to recognize human rights. As early
as 1971, at the Economic Commission for Africa Conference, OAU members
71. From the Organisationof African Unity (OA U) to the African Union (AU): The 50-Year Path Towards
African Unity, AFR.-EU P'SHIP (May 28, 2013), http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/allnews/organisaton-african-unity-oau-african-union-au-50-year-path-towards-african-unity.
72 . Luis GABRIEL FRANCESCHI, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIAL SYSTEM:
STREAMLINING STRUCTURES AND DOMESTICATION MECHANISMS VIEWED FROM THE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS POWER PERSPECTIVE 107 (2014).
73. Id. at 106 (citing Draft African Charter Prepared for the Meeting of Experts in Dakar, Senegal,

from 28 November to 8 December 1979, CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.1 (reprinted in CHRISTOF HEYNS,
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 81 (2002))).

74. Id. at 142.
75. ACommHPR, Information Sheet No. 1: Establishment, Org. Aft. Unity (on file with The
Virginia journal of International Law).
76. AFR.-EU P'SHIP, supranote 71.
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endorsed the creation of a human rights commission, but they suggested that
the "promotion rather than [the] interpretation of human rights" was the
goal.77 By 1979, the OAU adopted a resolution to draft a formal human rights
convention for Africa. The OAU assembly eventually formalized and
unanimously approved the Charter by 1981. The Charter came into force in
1986.
The AU is the successor to the OAU and serves as the regional or
continental association of African states. The Coistitutive Act of 2000 initially
divided the AU into nine organs: the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government ("Assembly"); the Executive Council of Ministers ("Executive
Council"); the Pan-African Parliament, the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights ("ACJHR"); the Secretariat of the Union ("Commission"); the
Permanent Representatives
Committee; the Specialized Technical
Committees; the Economics, Social, and Cultural Council; and the Financial
Institutions.78 In 2001, the AU added a tenth organ: the Peace and Security
Council ("PSC").79 Subsequently, in 2004, the AU created the ACourtHPR to

'

work in conjunction with the existing ACommHPR80 while the AU reviewed
the structure, operation, and jurisdiction of the ACJHR. Despite
ACourtHPR's creation, the ACommHPR remains the oldest and most
important human rights body in Africa to date.8
In addition to the ACommHPR and the ACourtHPR at the regional level,
three sub-regional courts also hear human rights claims. The ECOWAS
Court, EACJ, and SADCT are the most prominent African sub-regional
courts, roughly representing West, East, and South Africa, respectively. These
courts were originally established as sub-regional trade tribunals but now
exercise jurisdiction over human rights cases as part of their general
jurisdiction. For example, fifteen West African states founded ECOWAS in
197582 to promote economic integration and trade liberalization. At the time,
ECOWAS envisaged a tribunal to handle interstate disputes between
members, but ECOWAS never created one.83 In 1993, however, ECOWAS

77. Timothy F. Yerima, Over Two Decades ofAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rghts: Flying or
Fledging, 12 GLOBALJ. hUM. SOC. Sci. ARTS & HUMAN. 12, 56 (2012).

78. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 37733.

&

79. AFR. UNION [AU],AU in a Nutshell, https://www.au.int/web/en/au-nutshell (last visited Feb.
18, 2016).
80. See infra Section IV (explaining the relationship between these two adjudicatory bodies).
81. Kenya Commits $1mn to Unstoppable' African Court of Justice, PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGIC
COMMC'NS. UNIT (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/01/kenya-commrits-lmn-tounstoppable-african-court-of-justice/ (calling the ACourtHPR "unstoppable").
82. Although the membership has changed slightly over time, the founders were Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libetia, Mali, Mauritania,
Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. See supra note 65.
83. ECOW/AS CCJ. Court of]usice ofthe Economic Community of West African States, AFR. INT'L CTS.
TRIBS., http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts-subreg/ecowas/ecowashome.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
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revised its treaty to replace the non-existent tribunal with today's ECOWAS
Court. 84
The ECOWAS Court's early history does not suggest that the Court was
designed to promote individual liberties or human rights. After all, the
ECOWAS Court's limited jurisdiction only covered disputes between
85
member states and did not provide access to private litigants. ECOWAS did
not appoint judges to the ECOWAS Court until 2001. Also, as late as 2004,
the ECOWAS Court interpreted its founding protocol to limit its jurisdiction
86
to cases brought by member states. Yet, in 2005, ECOWAS adopted a
Supplementary Protocol that gave the ECOWAS Court the immediate
87
authority to hear human rights cases.

Similarly, the EAC founded the EACJ in 2001, but EAC member states
did not view the EACJ as a key component of EAC, and so they did not fund
88
or recognize it as an independent judicial organ. Unsurprisingly, the EAC
member states also did not formally grant the EACJ jurisdiction to hear
human rights cases. 89 Instead, the EACJ, in a series of cases in the late 2000s,
began to construe its authority broadly to entertain human rights cases, often
90
against the wishes of the EAC member states.
Finally, the SADCT has a similar past to the EACJ, but with a much

different ending. SADC formed the SADCT in 1992,91 but the SADCT did
not become operational until late 2005.92 In 2008, after the SADCT found
Zimbabwe liable for illegally removing white farmers from their own property
93
as part of a state-run land redistribution program, Zimbabwe lobbied the
other SADC member states to suspend the SADCT's authority to hear
complaints brought by individuals against states. In 2012, SADC acceded to
Zimbabwe's wishes and limited the SADCT's jurisdiction to complaints
between member states. Since only individuals had petitioned the SADCT to
94
that point, it was essentially disbanded. In 2014, SADC formally reinstated

84. Id.
85. Alter et al., supra note 5, at 746.
86. Id. at 751.
87. ECOPWAS CCJ, supra note 83. For an in-depth discussion of this process, see Alter, et al., supra
note 5.
88. See Gathii, supra note 7, at 249-50.
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id. at 251.
91 . Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, available at
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaraton-Treaty-ofSADC.pdf.
92. Free Zenda, The SADC Tribunal and the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (Sept.
2010) (unpublished LL.D. thesis, University of South Africa), http://www.peacepalacelbrary.nl/
ebooks/files/38258094X.pdf.
93. Mike Campbell Ltd. v. Rep. of Zim., S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib., Case No. 2/2007 [2008] SADCT
2 (Nov. 28, 2008).
Permanent# DisbandSADC Tribunal, HERALD
94. Zvamaida Murwira, SouthernAfrka: Regionalleaders
82 893
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/20120 10 .htm-l.
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the SADCT with limited jurisdiction to hear disputes between member
states, 95 ending the tribunal as a venue to vindicate individual human rights
claims. 96
Since the ECOWAS Court, EACJ, and SADCT were each created by
state parties to founding sub-regional treaties, these courts do not have a
formal relationship with the ACommHPR and the ACourtHPR. Although, in
theory, individuals could bring human rights claims to both a sub-regional and
a regional adjudicatory body. For purposes of this Article, the non-human
rights component of the ECOWAS Court, EACJ, and SADCT caseloads
trade cases - is not included in the dataset.
2.

FormalAuthority and Basic Procedures

The regional and sub-regional courts that comprise the African court
system can hear claims based on the Charter; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"); 97 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR");98 and the Convention
Against Torture ("CAT").99 These regional and international treaties provide
the underlying substantive law for human rights claims in the dataset. The
ACourtHPR 0 0 ECOWAS Court,1 0 EACJ,102 and SADCT's1 03 judgments
are formally binding on individuals and state parties. The status of the
ACommHPR's judgments, however, is contested and is discussed at greater
95. Id.
96. Tileni Mongudhi, SADC Tribunal to Pay N$10m in Retrenchment Packages, NAMIBIAN (Oct. 10,
2013), http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=1 15090&page=archive-read.
97. See generaly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; SARAH JOSEPH,JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2000).
98. See general ICCPR, supra note 97; Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States
Parties'Obligations Under the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Sodal and CulturalRights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156
(1987).
99. See generaly Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; MANFRED NOwAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE
UNITED NATIONS CON VENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY (2008).
100. African Court on Human and Peoples'Rtghts, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'

RIGHTS [ACOMMHPR], http://www.achpr.org/about/afchpr/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
101 . Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice, INT'L JUSTICE RES.
CTR.,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/regional-communities/economic-community-of-west-african-states-court-ofjustice/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) ("The Court's decisions on human rights matters interpret the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, considered by Article 1(h) of Protocol A/SP1 /12/01 to contain
'constitutional principles shared by all Member States' as legally binding on ECOWAS Member States.
Corporations and individuals can submit complaints alleging human rights violations by the Community
or Member State actors.") (citing Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Protocol on

Democracy and Good Governance, Dec. 21, 2001, A/SPI/12/01, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
law/compilation_democracy/ecowasprot.htm)).
102. James Thuo Gathii, Variationin the Use ofSubregionalIntegrationCourts Between Business and Human
RightsActors The Case ofthe EastAfrican Court oflustice, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 37 (2016).
103. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, supra note 91, art. 16(5).
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length in Section III. Given the prominence of ACommHPR cases in the
dataset, below is a more detailed description of its procedures and formal
authority.
To bring a claim, a complainant presents a "communication" or
complaint with the relevant allegations and supporting information to the
ACommHPR.1 04 The ACommHPR then informs the relevant state of the
communication through a "note verbale" and provides the case
documentation.10 5 After the ACommHPR considers the communication and
conducts an investigation, it issues a judgment. 106 The ACommHPR's
judgment provides the facts and the procedural posture of the case. If it
determines that a state is in violation, the judgment usually concludes with a
statement of violations and remedies. 107 Despite the use of the term
"judgment," as a formal matter the ACommHPR's decisions are not legally
108
However, the ACommHPR submits an annual
binding on the states.
"Activity Report" to the AU Assembly for formal adoption and
publication. 109 If adopted, it has been argued that the recommendations then
110
For ease of exposition, I will describe
become legally binding on the states.
the various decisions, orders, recommendations, and findings of the African
court system as "judgments."
B. Data on Human Rights Cases
In this section, I present data on every human rights claim brought
between 1988 and 2015 in the African court system: the ACommHPR, the

ACourtHPR, the ECOWAS Court, the SADCT, and the EACJ. As I noted
above, the cases are drawn from the African Human Rights Case Law

Analyser ("AHRCLA").111 All of the decisions are in English, and the
112
database appears complete and regularly updated.

&

104. Banjul Charter, supra note 6, arts. 48-49, 55.
105. Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights of 2010 2R. 86,
ACommHPR, May 12-26, 2010, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/rules-of-procedure- 010/
[hereinafter ACommHPR Rules of Procedure].
106. See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance ndth the Recommendations of the African
Commission on Human andPeople's Rights: 1994-2004, 101 AM.J. INT'LL. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Viljoen
Louw, State Compliance].

107. Id.
108. Banjul Charter, supra note 6.
109. ACommHPR Rules of Procedure, supra note 105.
110. Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, The Status of the Findings of the African Commission: F.-rom Moral

Persuasionto Legal Oblgation, 48J. AFR. L. 1, 19 ("A decision of the Assembly therefore confirms the legally
binding nature of the |judgment,] or 'converts' a quasi-legal |judgment] into a legally binding
decision .... '.
111. See generallyAfrican Human Rights Case Law Analyser, supra note 23.

112. Ideally, I would be able to crosscheck every case in the AHRCLA against the individual
caseloads from each of the courts in the African court system to ensure that the database includes every
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For each human rights claim, I have collected information regarding the
case name, the status of the complainant (individual or organization), the legal
basis of the claim, the relevant regional or international treaty, the state party
allegedly in violation, the year the claim was adjudicated, and the final
disposition of the case.
1.

GeneralResults

Number of Cases ly Year. Over the twenty-seven-year period since the
creation of the first regional human rights body in Africa - the ACommHPR
in 1987 - the data shows that 337 human rights cases were adjudicated across
the five regional and sub-regional bodies charged with hearing human rights
claims based on alleged violations of the Charter and other international
human rights treaties.11 3 Figure 1 on the next page provides data on the
number of human cases adjudicated annually.
Data by Court. The ACommHPR adjudicated the vast majority of the 337
cases - some 250 - with the remaining distributed among the four other
regional and sub-regional courts. Figure 2 on the next page illustrates the
prominence of the ACommHPR as the main human rights adjudicator in
Africa.

single case over the relevant period. As of this writing, unfortunately, the courts do not regularly update
their websites or publish readily available summaries of filed, pending, and adjudicated cases. The
AHRCLA is a reliable source commonly used in the literature on African courts, perhaps most
prominently in Karen Alter's excellent book on international courts. See general ALTER, supra note 1.
113. The ACommHPR has a significant backlog of cases. Although its exact size is unknown, one
can estimate the backlog at over one hundred cases. The ACommHPR states that each commumcation
is numbered to reflect the total number of communications received and the year each was received. The
highest numbered document available on the ACommHPR's website as of February 2016 was 464/12.
Communications, ACOMMHPR, http://www.achpr.org/communications/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
Assuming that the numbering system is accurate and the website is regularly updated, case 144/12 is the
464th communication received by the ACommiHPR. In addition, this particular communication was filed
in 2012. Since the ACommHPR has adjudicated 337 cases, and the latest case adjudicated is number 464,
one would expect that over 100 cases are still pending.
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the five African regional or sub-regional courts.1 14 For these cases, the
most common reason for dismissal is the failure to exhaust local remedies
(forty-nine cases), with the remainder including insufficient efforts by the
complainant; complaints where the alleged offender was not a party to the
treaty; and time-barred complaints."' Overall, over 14% of the 337 claims
were dismissed on exhaustion grounds.116 Of the remaining 152 cases

adjudicated on the merits, 113 resulted in a judgment of a violation, with
all but one of the remaining cases resulting in no violation.' 17 Given this
result, of the 337 claims before the five courts in the African court system
over a twenty-seven-year period, approximately 34% resulted in a finding
that there was a violation of the ACHPR, ICCPR, ICESCR, or CAT.
2.

Case Characteristics

Most Common Claims. The Charter serves as the legal basis for the vast
majority of the claims (over 310 cases; 92% of the total), with a few cases
referring to the other international human rights treaties mentioned above
or involving internal employment disputes between court employees the
courts themselves. A large number of the cases involve human rights
claims relating to arbitrary detention or the right to a fair trial (147 cases;
44% of the total). To be clear, the complainants in each case alleged that
the relevant state party violated several articles of the Charter, meaning
that every case had multiple claims. I reviewed each case to determine the
"primary" or "dominant" claim alleged by complainant or complainants."'
Figure 3 below shows the percentage and raw number of the six most
frequent human rights claims in the dataset.

114. Daniel Abebe, Compilation of African court cases (on file with The Virginia journal of
International Law).
115. Beyond the failure to exhaust local remedies, common reasons for dismissal include insufficient
efforts by the complainant, complaints where the alleged offender was not a party to the treaty, and timebarred complaints. Id.
116. Id
117. Id. One SADC case, United Republic of Tanzania v. Cimexpan (Mauritius) Ltd. and Others,
SADC (T) Case No. 01/2009, Southern Africa Development Community Tribunal [SADC] (June 11,
2010), http://dev.ihrda.org/doc/01.09/view/, was decided on the merits against one party and dismissed
against the other for failure to exhaust local remedies.
118. This is certainly imprecise. At the very least, the information on claims provides a rough
background on the type of claims that were most prominent among the 337 cases.
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The distinction between cases brought by an individual and those brought
by human rights organizations or other non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") might not seem relevant, since it is common in human rights
litigation for individual claimants to receive legal advice and financial support
from organizations. Although specific information on litigation funding is
extremely difficult to acquire, Section I(D) addresses issues of funding and
the operation of the African court system in general." 9
Casesper State. Nearly half of the 337 cases - 153 cases - involved claims
brought against eight states: Nigeria (41), Zimbabwe (25), the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("DRC") (17), Cameroon (17), Gambia (15), Kenya (14),
Sudan (13), and Ethiopia (11). The list is perhaps unsurprising since Nigeria
and Ethiopia are Africa's largest countries by population, and Zimbabwe,
Kenya, Sudan, and the DRC have had high levels of internal strife over the
period covered by the dataset, including ethnic violence, civil war, and claims
of genocide. Figure 5 below shows the total number of cases (163) brought
against these states and, for correlational purposes, their average Freedom
House ("FH") scores during the relevant period. By way of background, an
FH score of one denotes "most free," while an FH score of seven denotes
"least free."1 20
45
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Figure5: Cases and Freedom House Scores

119. See infra Section IV.
120. Freedom in the World 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/fteedom-world-2016 (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
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C Implementation ofAfrican Court System judgments
As noted above, only 113 of the 337 cases in the dataset resulted in a
finding of a violation of the Charter or an international human rights
treaty. The AHRCLA database, however, does not have data on the final
resolution of these cases, namely whether the state party in violation
actually enforced judgments. This is important since a key measure of the
effectiveness of an international court is the state implementation and
compliance rate. The following section provides more information on
implementation. Determining state compliance rates is extremely
complicated, and the data below are a combination of in-depth studies,
anecdotal evidence, and general observations about the operation of the
African court system and the national executives, judiciaries, and
legislatures charged with implementing adverse legal judgments.
1.

The ACommHPR and ACourtHPR

Over the period covered in the dataset, the ACommHPR and the
ACourtHPR adjudicated 271 cases, of which eighty-three resulted in a
violation. What is unclear, however, is what number of those judgments the
offending state party has enforced. Gathering compliance data is exceedingly
difficult due to questions about the binding nature of ACommHPR decisions,
lack of clarity in its judgments, and the problem of precisely defining state
implementation. Still, some studies have attempted to address this very
important question.
In 2007, Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw published the first
comprehensive study of state implementation of ACommHPR judgments
(they use the term "recommendations"), evaluating a nearly ten-year period
121
Since the ACommHPR lacks "any follow-up
between 1994 and mid-2003.
to monitor state compliance with its
place
in
mechanism or policy
22
recommendations,"1 Viljoen and Louw assessed compliance by those states
23
that the ACommHPR found in violation of the Charter. 1 During the
relevant period, they found forty-four ACommHPR judgments that a state
party was in violation of the Charter and categorized them along a spectrum
of implementation including: (1) full compliance; (2) non-compliance; (3)
24
partial compliance; (4) sui generis compliance; (5) and unclear cases.1
To ensure the accuracy of my data, I compared the Viljoen and Louw
findings with my coding of the human rights cases in the AHRCLA dataset.
121. Seegeneraly Viljoen & Louw, State Compliance, supra note 106.
122. See id. at 3.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 5.
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Over the same period, I found fifty-two ACommHPR judgments of state
violations, a result generally consistent with Viljoen and Louw's study, but I
do not have data on state compliance. For their study, Viljoen and Louw spent
three years collecting information and interviewing a range of key parties to
gather data on state implementation of ACommHPR judgments.1 25 They
found six cases of full compliance, thirteen cases of noncompliance, fourteen
cases of partial compliance, seven cases of sui generis compliance (in these
cases, the noncompliant regime collapsed), and four cases of unclear
compliance.1 26 Using this coding system, Viljoen and Louw identified twentyone cases of either full or partial compliance with ACommHPR judgments,
representing approximately 45% of the forty-four state violations during the
almost ten-year period in their study.1 27
However, as Section I suggests, defining and measuring compliance is
methodologically challenging. Despite the rigor and exhaustiveness of the
Viljoen and Louw study, a few definitional issues complicate their findings.
For example, Viljoen and Louw treat a state as fully compliant if "it has
implemented [all of the ACommHPR's recommendations] or has
unequivocally expressed the political will to comply with their substance and
has already taken steps in this process."1 28 Yet, as Viljoen and Louw also

carefully acknowledge, deciphering political will is complicated. Use of this
measure might very well over-represent the state compliance rate because it
relies on assessments of government statements and political "will" instead of
looking directly at legal outcomes for human rights victims.1 29 Since Viljoen
and Louw only find six cases of full compliance with this more expansive
definition, the result suggests that state implementation of ACommHPR
judgments is poor.
Similarly, "partial compliance" is even more fraught as a category because
it necessarily expands the concept of compliance, potentially converting
instances
of functional
noncompliance into partial compliance.
Implementation of an ACommHPR judgment could be "ongoing,"1 30 but the
partial steps toward compliance might not transform into full compliance.
Viljoen and Louw also perceptively note that state compliance falling within
the sui generis category has basically nothing to do with implementing the
ACommHPR's judgment. Rather, such compliance generally reflects "a
transition from an undemocratic and repressive to a more stable and

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id.
Id at

4.
5-7.
6.
5.
6.
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131
Despite these concerns, the Viljoen
democratic system of government."
and Louw study provides the best information available for assessing state
compliance with ACommHPR judgments, and the record is mixed at best.
More recently, in 2015, Rachel Murray and Debra Long published the
results of a four-year investigation into the implementation of ACommHPR's

judgments, provisional measures, and mission reports, with a specific focus
32
on the myriad factors that impact (and impair) state compliance.1 Rather
than assessing state implementation and expanding on the Viljoen and Louw
study, Murray and Long focus on the institutional and procedural
impediments at both the regional and state level that limit the ACommHPR's
33
capacity to ensure that its judgments are respected.1 They evaluate the many
obstacles to state implementation (described below), and then they offer a
series of normative proposals to improve the operation of the
34

ACommHPR.1
Their study does not include data on state compliance rates, but it
provides helpful background on the ACommHPR's structural limitations.
Since the ACommHPR's organizational issues affect the implementation of
its judgments, some of the problems are worth exploring here. For example,
Murray and Long highlight the ongoing debate about the binding nature of
36
35
the ACommHPR's judgments.1 As discussed above,1 Some argue that
whatever the formal language of the Charter, the adoption of the
ACommHPR's annual Activity Reports by the AU gives binding authority to
37
ACommHPR's judgments.1 The ACommHPR itself has taken the same
view and declared that its judgments are binding as "authoritative
38
interpretation of the Charter."1 But the ACommHPR has also "noted the
39
quasi-judicial nature of its mandate."1 The need to issue legally binding
judgments and support the ACommHPR's mission is what motivated
40
ACourtHPR's creation, in significant part.1 Whatever the merits of the
competing positions, some African states refuse to enforce the
ACommHPR's judgments because of their allegedly non-binding nature.
Moreover, the inconsistent form and lack of clarity in the ACommHPR's
judgments present obstacles to state implementation. Judgments sometimes
only include a series of findings, rather than orders or specified remedies,
131. Id.
132. MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 42-43.

133. See generally id.
134. The proposals are discussed in greater depth in Section IV.
135. MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 53-55.

136. Supra Section II(B)(2).
137. Id.
138. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 339 (2d. ed. 2012).
139. MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 53.

140. Id
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making it much easier for states to ignore or refuse to implement them.141

ACommHPR judgments also vary widely in length, quality of reasoning, and
clarity of specific remedies,1 42 and there are substantial delays -

often

measured in years - before judgments are published and disseminated.1 43
Finally, the ACommHPR does not have clear mechanisms for notifying the
states, complainants, or human rights groups who are parties to the underlying
complaint of its final disposition.144 Perhaps this should not be surprising: as
recently as 2008, the ACommHPR had "a severe shortage of staff, particularly
in the legal section of the Secretariat, and yet the bulk of the activities carried
out by the African Commission are supposed to be done with support and
assistance of the legal officers." 45
Numerous institutional issues at the state level compound the problems

at the ACommHPR.14 6 As described in Section I, although nearly all African
states are parties to the Charter (with the exception of South Sudan),1 47 many
of them have not taken steps to implement the Charter domestically,14 8
meaning that it might not be enforceable against domestic actors. Few African
states permit domestic courts to enforce the judgments of international or
regional courts, let alone quasi-legal bodies such as the ACommHPR.14 9 Even
if they did, knowledge of ACommHPR decisions and international law among
national judiciaries is very low, 1so limiting the kind of judicial crossfertilization and dialogue that could assist in the development of domestic

human rights law. In fact, according to Murray and Long, "our research and
that of others shows still, twenty-seven years after the African Commission

was established, the lack of visibility of the ACHPR and the findings of the
African Commission at the domestic level."1 5 Since the ACommHPR does
not inform national legislatures of its judgments, these legislatures lack
awareness of the ACommHPRs' activitieS1 52 and consequently seldom discuss
ACommHPR judgments as legislative matters. 153 Further, when the
ACommHPR notifies states of adverse judgments - generally through the
ministry of foreign affairs or external relations - the judgments are not
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id at 113.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id at 143, 232.

145. MALCOLM EVANS & RACHEL MURRAY, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'

RIGHTS 340 (2011).
146. See infra Section III (describing the issues in greater depth).
147. Banjul Charter, supranote 6.
148. Viljoen & Louw, State Compliance, supra note 106, at 4.
149. MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 95.
150. Id. at 74.
151. Id. at 97.
152. Id at 102-04.
153. Id. at 104.
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consistently forwarded to the relevant department, unit, agency, or bureau
154
within the state charged with enforcement and implementation.
Murray and Long helpfully describe the general institutional and
structural challenges in securing compliance. To add more detail, I have
summarized below four human rights cases in which the ACommHPR has
concluded that a state is in violation of the Charter. The cases are clearly
illustrative - not necessarily representative of all ACommHPR judgments
but they provide context on the relationship between the ACommHPR and
some state violators of the Charter. The cases also reflect the difficulties in
defining partial and full state compliance.
For example, in John K Modise v. Botswana (2000), the ACommHPR
determined that the government of Botswana had violated John K. Modise's
right to citizenship under the ACHPR by denying him citizenship in Botswana
55
and deporting him to South Africa.1 In providing relief for Mr. Modise, the
ACommHPR recommended that Botswana grant him citizenship and provide
him adequate compensation for his damages. 156 As of 2010, Botswana
maintained the position that the ACommHPR's recommendations were not
legally binding on state parties. 57 Nonetheless, Botswana offered Mr. Modise
compensation for the violation of his rights under the ACHPR, but he
rejected the offer as inadequate. It appears that the government of Botswana
has not taken any additional steps to comply with the ACommHPR's
58
recommendation.1
Similarly, in Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea (2003), the
ACommHPR concluded that the government of Eritrea violated the ACHPR
by illegally detaining fifteen persons, mainly former government officials,
59
based on their political affiliations.1 The ACommHPR recommended that
60
the detainees be released and compensated.1 As of 2013, the government of
Eritrea had not implemented the ACommHPR's recommendation,161 and
some detainees have since died in jail or disappeared (or their whereabouts
are unknown).1 62 A similar pattern is evident in Article 19 v. Eritrea (2007), as

154. Id. at 100-01.
155. John K. Modise v. Botswana, Communication 97/1993, ACommHPR, at 12 (2000),
97 93
14ar/achpt28_97_93_14ar-eng.pdf.
.
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/28th/comunications/
156. Id.
157. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rzghts, 1 HUM. RTS. MONITOR Q. 44,45 n.2 (2013).
REFUGEES DAILY, http://www.unhcr.
158. See Botswana Urged to Implement Decsion on John Modise,
9
4 4
23
2
org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef 11 &id= b C21 b5 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
159. Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, Communication 250/2002, ACommHPR, at
7 (2003), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/34th/comunications/250.02/achpr34_250_02_eng.pdf.
160. Id
Periodic Review, ARTICLE 19 (June 24,
161. See Eritrea:ARTIClE 19's Submission to the UN Universal
3 71
20/en/eritrea:-article-19's-submission-to2013), http://www.aticle19.org/resources.php/resource/
the-un-universal-periodic-review.
162. Id
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the ACommHPR determined that the government of Eritrea violated the
ACHPR by arbitrarily detaining eighteen journalists.1 63 The ACommHPR
recommended that Eritrea release the detained journalists, provide them with
a fair trial, pay them adequate compensation, and lift its ban on the press.1 64
As of 2015, the government of Eritrea still had not implemented the
ACommHPR's recommendation.1 65
Finally, in Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v. Republic of Sudan (2013), the
ACommHPR found that the government of Sudan violated the Charter by
arbitrarily arresting and mistreating individuals at several refugee camps.1 66 It
recommended that Sudan conduct an investigation regarding the treatment of
refugees, then compensate the victims and reform its security procedures. As
of June 2014, Sudan had yet to take measures to implement the
ACommHPR's recommendations.' 67 To fully understand the complicated
relationship between the AComnHPR and AU member states, a deeper
qualitative inquiry is likely necessary. While such an inquiry is beyond the
scope of this Article, these cases shed light on some of the obstacles that the
ACommHPR must overcome to ensure that its judgments are respected.
2.

African Sub-Regional Courts

African sub-regional courts have similar problems with state compliance,
although the number of human rights cases and judgments of violation is
much smaller than that of the ACommHPR. Still, for all the courts, state
compliance rates are very difficult to determine due to a lack of reliable data.
By way of background, the EACJ has formally adjudicated eighteen human
rights cases, with six resulting in a judgment of violation. Note, however, that
information is not readily available on whether the nations found in violation
of human rights treaties have taken steps to comply with the EACJ's
judgments. The ECOWAS Court has adjudicated twenty-five human rights
cases, with nine resulting in a judgment of violation. Similarly, as of this
writing, I cannot confirm if states have complied with these judgments.
Finally, the SADCT adjudicated twelve cases, ten of which resulted in an
adverse judgment for the state party. Zimbabwe was the state violator in eight

163. Article 19 v. Eritrea, Communication 275/03, AComnHPR, at 13 (2007), http://www.achpr.
org/files/sessions/41st/comunications/275.03/achpr4l275_03eng.pdf at 13.
164. Id.
165. Abraham T. Zere, If We Don't Give Them a Voice, No One Wi': Eritrea'sForgottenjournalists, Still

jailed After 14 Years, GUARDLAN (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/19/
eritrea-forgotten-journalists-jailed-pen-international-press-freedom.

166. Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v. Republic of Sudan, Communication 368/2009, ACommHPR
(2013),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/54th/comunications/368.09/achpr54 decis 368 09
sudan_2013_- eng.pdf.
167. See Sudan's Human Rights Crisis: Hzgh Time to Take Artcle 2 of the Covenant Seriousy, REDRESS

(June 2014), http://www.refworld.org/docid/53a2a4584.html.
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of the cases. Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the
state offenders in the other cases. Overall, the ECOWAS Court, EACJ, and
SADCT have adjudicated fifty-six human rights cases, resulting in twenty-five
4 0
adverse judgments against state parties ( 4 /o), a higher rate than for the
ACommHPR and the ACourtHPR (31%), although drawn from a smaller
sample.
In contrast to the much-contested status of ACommHPR judgments,

EACJ, ECOWAS, and SADCT judgments are legally binding on state parties.
Does the binding nature of such judgments suggest that compliance rates for
these sub-regional courts is or will be higher? While concrete data on
implementation of human rights judgments for the EACJ, ECOWAS Court,
and SADCT are unavailable, some anecdotal evidence and case studies might
be useful.
As a threshold issue, Murray and Long reject the idea that African states
are more likely to enforce legally binding human rights judgments (hard law)
68
is not borne
than non-binding decisions (soft law).1 The "presumption ...
out in practice before other regional courts, and neither is it borne out by the,
69
albeit limited, practice of the African Court.1 In fact, after the SADCT's
legally binding adverse judgments against Zimbabwe in 2009 and 2010 from

suits by individuals, the SADC simply limited the jurisdiction of the SADCT
to "disputes between member states," making it impossible for individuals to
bring human rights claims. 170 Human Rights Watch noted that SADC
members "ordered a review of the tribunal's role, functions, and terms of
reference."' 7 ' It also "instructed the tribunal not to take on any new cases,
72
and it blocked the re-appointment of eligible judges."1 The SADCT example
notwithstanding, some argue that the other sub-regional courts (the EACJ
and the ECOWAS Court) might be better placed to have states implement
their human rights judgments.
For example, James Gathii carefully describes the EACJ's decision in the
17 3
- in the absence of
mid-2000s to begin adjudicating human rights claims

168. See MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 10-26.

169. Id. at 142.
170. SADC: Qe&A on the Tribunal, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 11, 2011, 4:18 PM)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/11/sadc-qa-tribunal.
171. SADC. Q&A on the Tribunal, supra note 170; S. Afr. Dev. Cmty., Final Communiqui of the 32nd
Summit ofSADC Heads ofState andGovernment (Aug. 18,2012), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/
32
nd Summit-of Heads-of States.pdf.
afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Communique_

172. Id.
173. Gathii, supra note 7, at 252 (The EAC]'s determination to expand its authority to human rights
cases is part of "building and forging judicial autonomy that derives from the entrepreneurship,
resourcefulness, and creativity of the judges on the court and of the court's long-standing registrar").
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a specific grant of jurisdiction from the EAC member states 174 as
exemplifying a "new trend in African regional human rights enforcement." 175
Despite the EACJ's initial design as a "tribunal to resolve trade disputes," it
has evolved into a sub-regional court that "seeks to hold member
governments accountable for violations of human rights and to promote good
governance and the rule of law." 176 Gathii discusses the EACJ's recent human
rights caseload, noting that it has adjudicated cases against Uganda and
Rwanda for arbitrary detention and against Kenya for failing to pursue
investigations concerning serious allegations of murder, torture, and cruelty
by Kenyan security forces. 177 In short, the EACJ has set itself apart from
domestic courts in the region, as "East Africa has no history of judicial
activism, and national judiciaries in general have been very passive."1 78 The
EACJ's human rights caseload is a "remarkable achievement, rather than a
general pattern of courts in the region."1 79
Still, it is unclear whether these developments will result in higher state
compliance rates. Perhaps revealingly, Gathii characterizes the expansion of
the EACJ's human rights jurisdiction as a tool to overcome its substantial
institutional and structural deficiencies, including "the ad hoc basis on which
most of its judges serve and the failure to settle their terms of service, the lack
of a permanent location and building, insufficient staff, and an inadequate
budget to pay for its operations."'so Again, the expansion of the EACJ's
jurisdiction to human rights is recent, and any assessment of state compliance
at this stage is tentative at best.
In 2005, ECOWAS member states formally expanded the jurisdiction of
the ECOWAS Court to hear human rights cases.1 8' Karen Alter, Laurence
Helfer, and Jacqueline McAllister describe the ECOWAS Court as "an
increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights," 182 with an
enhanced human rights jurisdiction and a caseload including "judgments
against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for

174. Id. at 251 (noting that EACJ "[has] construed its] powers broadly to allow [it] to decide human
rights cases even though [its] constitutive treaties ...
do not include a specific grant of jurisdiction to
entertain human rights cases").

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id at 250.
Id
Id. at 251.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 259.

181. Supplementary Protocol Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 of Protocol
(A/P.1/7/91) Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English

Version of the Said Protocol,Jan. 19, 2005, A/SP1/01/05, http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf
files/supplementary-protocol.pdf.
182. Alter et al., supra note 5, at 737.
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183
In their study
impeding the right to free basic education for all children."
McAllister
and
Helfer,
Alter,
of the ECOWAS Court and its evolution,
interviewed key domestic, regional, and international players, ranging from

judges to human rights organizations, and found that ECOWAS states "gave
the ECOWAS Court a broad human rights jurisdiction, and they have

eschewed opportunities to narrow the Court's authority."

184

Since the

expansion of its jurisdiction, the ECOWAS Court has issued several
consequential human rights judgments that "grab headlines, and they
85
significantly enhance the Court's salience and visibility across West Africa."1

With respect to implementation, however, Alter, Helfer, and McAllister
concede that "the Court faces an ongoing challenge of securing compliance
with its judgments" and that at such an early stage of its development, the
86
ECOWAS Court's future is not clear.1 They do note, however, that the
ECOWAS Court is actually not dissimilar to "the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights," both of which "took
decades to establish their authority, whereas sub-regional tribunals in Africa
87
In short, the ECOWAS Court has significant
are still in their infancy."
challenges but also perhaps the most promise of the African sub-regional
courts.
It is hard to draw broad conclusions about the African court system's
effectiveness from a single study. For example, because of the difficulties in
securing accurate state compliance data, it is complicated to assess the
implementation of judgments. Further, the relative immaturity of the African
court system cautions against condemning the courts before they have had
sufficient time to establish authority. Based on the evidence collected here,
including the Viljoen and Louw implementation study, the Murray and Long
assessment of the ACommHPR's operation, and the data provided in this
Article, the record of state compliance with AComniHPR judgments appears
mixed. For the sub-regional courts, the effective dissolution of SADCT as a
venue for human rights claims is a step backwards, but the recent
developments at the EACJ and the ECOWAS Court seem promising. In sum,
there does not seem to be strong evidence that state compliance with the
African court system's judgments is likely to improve significantly, at least in
the short- to medium-term.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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D. Funding ofthe African Court System
One way to measure the effectiveness of the African court system to hear
cases, review evidence, and issue judgments is to assess its overall funding. If
the African court system suffers from resource constraints that result in
shortages of judges and staff, for example, it is unlikely to maintain a large
enough caseload to impact human rights outcomes or encourage states to
comply with its decisions. Funding creates the judicial capacity to render more
judgments, and more judgments of violations against states should, in theory,
create an increasing number of opportunities to pressure states to comply
with African court system judgments.
The funding structure of the African court system naturally implicates
perceptions of its independence, neutrality, and autonomy and, by extension,
its effectiveness. If African states fully fund and operate the African court
system, its judgments, ceteris paribus, will likely have greater legitimacy and
expressive power than would judgments of an African court system funded
and operated by non-African states. In such a world, the African court system
would have a level of independence, neutrality, and autonomy far exceeding
a system dependent on foreign funding, and so it would likely enjoy greater
compliance with its decisions. The source of funding, in other words, has
concrete implications for the African court system's effectiveness.
The Section below assesses the African court system's funding structure.
The budget data presented below is incomplete and relies on the publicly
available information at the time of this writing. Unfortunately, the budget
data does not perfectly match the years covered in the database of human
rights cases drawn from the five courts in the African court system. Data for
the early years of the OAU, AU, and ACommHPR do not appear to be
publicly available, but, in light of the data presented in this Section, it is
unlikely that the funding structure has changed dramatically over the twentyseven years of this study. The data described below covers the periods
between 2009-11 and 2013-15,188 and it is drawn from AU activity reports
and declarations; SADC, EAC, and ECOWAS itemized organizational
budgets; newspaper articles; press releases from the various courts within the
African court system; and academic studies. Some of the organizational
budgets do not break down numbers for the individual courts, and I have
noted that where appropriate. While the data is not complete, it is sufficient
to show the fragility of some of the courts within the African court system
and their dependence on foreign donors to function. This conclusion - and
some of the anecdotal evidence offered below - suggests that the African
court system might have challenges in showing that it is an independent,
neutral, and autonomous court under the current funding structure.
188. 1 have been unable to locate the AU budget for 2012 at the time of this writing.
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The ACommHPR and ACourtHPR

The AU and its member states nominally fund the ACommHPR.
According to the Charter, "Provision shall be made for the emoluments
and allowances of the members of the Commission in the Regularly
Budget of the Organization of African Unity.""' As discussed in Section
II, the AU eventually replaced the now-defunct OAU. The ACommHPR
now relies on funding from the AU, the successor to the OAU.
Since the ACommHPR receives its budget from the AU, it is
important to analyze the AU's funding model. Figure 6 below shows the
overall AU budget and the sources of funding.
Period

2009
2010
2011
2013
2 014
2015

AU General

Contribution from

Contribution

% from

Budget
(in (inU

Member States
SD)

from Partners
USD)

Partners

$57,412,574
$93,804,243
$133,690,021
$111,763,676
$134,152,402
$122,602,045
$155,359,986
$122,86667
j$278,226_,622"'-$170,098 545
$126,050,898
$308,048,376194
$374,802,995
$131,471,086
_ $522,121,60219
Figure 6: AU Annual GeneralBudget
$164,256,81710
$250,453,697
$256,754 4479

34.95%
53.38%
52.24%
55.84%/
55.220/
71.78%

The bulk of the AU budget "is paid for by non-African donors, while the
96
rest is almost entirely paid for by just five of the member states,"1 specifically
97
"Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa."1 The largest overall
donors are the European Union, United States, World Bank, China, and
189. Banjul Charter, supra note 6.
2009), https://www.au.int/
190. AU Assembly Dec. 208 (XII), 12th Ordinary Sess., ¶ 1 (Feb. 1-3,
9
3
web/sites/default/files/decisions/9559assemblyen-1_ -february_200 auctwelfthordinary-sessio
n decisions declaratonsmessage-congratulations motion.pdf.
191 . AU Assembly Dec. 287 (XIV), 14th Ordinary Sess., T 1 (Jan. 31-Feb. 2, 2010),
956
1-assembly-en_31_january_2_feburuaryhttps://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/
2010_bcp-assembly-ofthe african unionfourteenthordinary-session.pdf.
192. AU Assembly Dec. 600 (XVIII), 26th Ordinary Sess., ¶ 1 (Jan. 24-28, 2011), https://www.au.
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1 4-assembly-au dec_588_- 604_xxvi_e.pdf.
int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/
193. AU Assembly Dec. 438 (XIX), 19th Ordinary Sess., T 2 (July 15-16, 2012), https://www.au.
651
-assembly.au-dec 416-449_xix-e-final.pdf.
int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9
194. AU Assembly Exec. Council Dec. 767 (XXIII), 23rd Ordinary Sess., 1 3 (May 19-23, 2013),
https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9658-ex cldec_767-782_xxiiice_.pdf.
195. AU Assembly Dec. 544 (XXII1), IM 1-3 (June 26-27, 2014), http://archive.au.int/collect/
auassemb/import/English/Assembly%/20AU%20Dec%20544%`20(XXIII)/20_E.pdf.
On, ECONOMIST (May 29, 2013, 11:53 AM),
196 . The African Union: Half a Centug
2
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/ 013/05/african-union-0.
197. Gabe Joselow, AU Buaget for 2013 Relies Heavil on Foreign Partners, VOICE OF AMERICA (July
16, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/au-budget-for_2013_relies-heavily-on_
foreign-parties/1405363.html.
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Turkey.19 8 The AU also has a number of donor partners, including seventytwo non-African states as well as regional integration and international
organizations accredited to the AU.199 The trend for the AU is a greater
dependence on foreign states, international organizations, and other outside
donors.
Figure 7 below shows the specific ACommHPR budget, divided into
operational and program components, over the same time period. The
program component refers to ACommHPR-led workshops, education
campaigns, and other marketing strategies to improve awareness of the
ACommHPR's mission.
Period

2009

2010
2011
2013
2014
2015

Total
Operational Budget
Program Budget
ACommHPR
(funded by AU Member
(funded by AU
Budget (in USD)
State
n
)
partners) (in USD)
$3,671,766200
$2,376,639
$1,295,127
$4,929,852201
$2,968,874
$1,960,978
$7,942,889202
$3,624,600
$4,318,289
8,488,716203$3,881,947
$4,606,770
$5,645,467204
$4,076,044
$1,569,423
22,595
4,970,825
$951,770
Figure 7: AnnualACommHPR Budget

What is not clear from the data is that the ACommHPR also relies on its
own private "extra-budgetary" sources - distinct from the program budget
mainly contributions from "Western" donors. 206 As long as the
ACommHPR informs the AU, it is permitted to negotiate financial
agreements with donors, accept funds, and invite donors to attend its
hearings. 207 The amount of extra-budgetary funding that the ACommHPR
receives annually and the list of donors is not readily available. The
ACommHPR likely relies on such funding to meet staffing shortages,
although there is not data directly supporting this contention. For example,

198. Agence France-Presse [AFP], No Strings Attached: African Union Seeks FinancialIndependence,

DAILY MAIL (Feb. 1, 2015, 6:42 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/ardcle-2935107/Nostrings-attached-African-Union-seeks-financial-independence.htn.

199. Non-Africa States & RegionalIntegration&International OganirationsAccreditedto theAU, AU (last

updated Jan. 21, 2011), http://au.int/en/partnerships/others.
200. AU Assembly Dec. 208 (XII), supra note 190, ¶ 2.
201. AU Assembly Dec. 287 (XIV), supra note 191, ¶ 2.
202. AU Assembly Dec. 600 (XVIII), supranote 192, ¶ 2.
203. AU Assembly Dec. 438 (XIX), sepra note 193, ¶ 3.
204. AU Assembly Exec. Council Dec. 783 (XXIV), 24th Ordinary Sess., ¶ 4 (Jan. 21 - 28, 2014),
https://www.wmo.int/amcomet/sites/default/files/field/doc/events/ex_cldec 783-812_xxiv.e.pdf.
205. AU Assembly Dec. 544 (XXIMI), supra note 195, T 2.
206. VILJOEN, supra note 138, at 294.
207. MuRuAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 241.
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anecdotally there were only two legal officers at the ACommHPR for more
than fifteen years prior to 2006, but I could not find data on the number of
legal officers on staff in 2015.208 Overall, the trend appears to reflect a
reduction in funding from AU partners, but it is not clear if or how the
reduction has impacted the ACommHPR's operations.

In contrast, the ACourtHPR is not as reliant on foreign donors as the
ACommHPR. As Figure 8 shows, the ACourtHPR receives a smaller
not
"AU partners" percentage of its funding from outside donors including extra-budgetary aid (which is not regularly listed in budget
documents and is unavailable). While it is not clear why the ACourtHPR is
less dependent on outside funding than is the ACommHPR, it is important
to note that the AU's overall budget and specific contributions to both
adjudicatory bodies are heavily subsidized by foreign donors, meaning that
the majority of the funding comes from non-African sources.

Period

Program Budget
(funded by AU
partners) (in

Operational
Budget (funded

Total
ACourtHPRI
Budget (iou USD)R

by AU Member

Budget_(inUSD)

States) (in USD)

2_ 009

$7,64,2,269209

$6,892,269

2010

$7,939,375210

2011

% from
Partners

USD)
__

$750,000

'10%

$6,169,591

$17974

22%/

$9,389,615211

$6,478,071

$2,911,544

31%

2013

$8,969,947212

$6,607,632

$2,362,315

26%

2014
2015

$8,619,58523
$985 665214

$6,938,014
$8,176,154

$1681,571
$1,681,511

20
17%

-

I

Figure 8: AnnualACourtHPRBudget

2.

The SADCT, the EACJ, and the ECOWAS Court

Unlike the ACommHPR and the ACourtHPR, budget data for the
SADCT and the EACJ were not available at the time of this writing. To work
around this problem, I examined the budget data for the SADC and the EAC
to determine the
- the regional organizations that created the courts on outside
depend
organizations
sources of their funding. If these regional
donors, it is likely that their courts rely on outside donors as well. For example,
the SADC is reliant on outside sources for funding: between 2005 and 2012,

208. See general#Activity Reports, ACOMMHPR, http://www.achpr.org/activity-reports/ (last visited

Feb. 18, 2016).
209. AU Assembly Dec. 208 (XII), supra note 190, ' 2.
210. AU Assembly Dec. 287 (XIV), stra note 191, T 2.
211. AU Assembly Dec. 600 (XVIII), supra note 192, ¶ 2.
212. AU Assembly Dec. 438 (XIX), supra note 193, ¶ 3.
213. AU Assembly Exec. Council Dec. 783 (XXIV), supra note 204, ¶ 4.
214. AU Assembly Exec. Council Dec. 767 (XXIII), supra note 194, ¶ 2.
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over 55% of its budget came from foreign donors, an amount totaling
approximately $217 million. 215 The United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,Japan, and the United
States are major bilateral donors, while the European Commission, the World
Bank, the African Development Bank, the UNDP, and other UN agencies
also provide support and financial assistance. 216 Since the SADCT is funded
by the SADC, it likely also relies on foreign donors to operate.
The EAC is perhaps the most reliant on outside donors of the African
sub-regional organizations. Figure 9 provides data on the EAC budget from
2012 through 2015, the years for which data is available. As Figure 9 shows,
foreign donors account for 65% of funding.
Year

Donor Contributions
(in USD)

EAC General Budget (in
USD)

%from
Partners

2012-2013

$97,079,329217

$138,316,455

70.17%

2013-2014

$85,676,850218

$130,429,394

65.69%

2014-2015

$75,121,126219

$124,069o625220

60.55%

Figure 9: Annual EAC Budget with DonorAid
According to the EAC, outside donors include the World Bank,
European Union, European Investment Bank, African Development Bank,
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the German, Danish,
Norwegian, Austrian, Swedish, and British domestic development agencies.
The EAC has also entered into memoranda of understanding with France,
India, Finland, and Canada, among others, for additional financial
assistance. 221

215. Anna van der Vleuten & Merran Hulse, Governance Transferby the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) (The Collaborative Research Ctr. 700, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No.
48, 2013), http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/workingpapers/wp48/SFB-GovernanceWorking-Paper-48.pdf.
216. AU Assembly Exec. Council Dec. 767 (XXIII), supra note 194, ¶ 2.
217. Christabel Ligami, Which State Will Callthe Tune in EAC? The FundingQuestion,E. AFR. (Oct. 6,
2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Which-state-will-call-the-tune-in-EAC-Thefunding-question-/-/2558/1526738/-/gkudgz/-/index.html.
218. Press Release, E. Aft. Legislative Assembly, EALA Approves EAC Budget (une 6, 2013),
http://www.eala.org/new/index.php/media-centre/press-releases/535-eala-approves-eac-budget.
219. East Africa: Donors to Fund Bulk of EAC Budget, E. AFR. Bus. WEEK (May 17, 2015),
http://alafrica.com/stories/201505182665.htm.
220. Id.
221. EAC Partnerships, E. AFR. CMTY. (last updated Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.eac.int/index.
php?option=com-content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=55.
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Finally, ECOWAS is the sub-regional organization least reliant on foreign
222
For example, in 2011,
funding, although the data is spotty and inconsistent.
approximately 84.4% of the ECOWAS budget was financed through the
organization's own resources, including a community levy and arrears of
contributions, with a wide range of external development partners providing

the remaining 15.6%.223 Similarly, in 2015, the ECOWAS general budget was
approximately $235 million, of which $13.5 million was specifically allocated
to the ECOWAS Court. Some $10.2 million of the ECOWAS Court
allocation - around 76% - came from the ECOWAS community levy on
member states and another $2.7 million (21%) came from the ECOWAS
reserve fund, meaning that approximately 96% of the ECOWAS Court
224
Based on the funding model
budget comes from ECOWAS member states.
alone, the ECOWAS Court is the most independent of the adjudicatory
bodies in the African court system.
In light of its funding model, the African court system faces unique
challenges in establishing its independence and neutrality. African regional
and sub-regional courts were created by African states but in most cases rely
on outside (mainly European) donors for their continued operation. In effect,
the African court system is an agent of two principals: foreign donors and
African founders, and the interests of the principals are not always aligned.
Moreover, the legitimacy of the African court system may very well be
undermined if those subject to its authority perceive the courts as European
instead of African. There is anecdotal evidence that this is a concern for some
judges in the African court system (discussed in Section IV). The structure of
the funding is not likely to change soon, and the African court system will
continue to struggle in establishing legitimacy and increasing its effectiveness.

The regional and sub-regional courts that comprise the African court
system have jurisdiction over fifty-three African states with a population of
approximately 1.1 billion people. They also have formal authority to
adjudicate human rights claims under the Charter and other international
222. See LUDGER KUHNHARDT, REGION BUiLDING: THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 267 (2011) ("The overall budget structure of ECOWAS remains something
of a mystery, as in many other regional groupings . . . .").
223. Economic Community of West African States Commission [ECOWAS Comm'n], 2011 Annual
Performance EvaluationReport of the ECOWAS Commission, ¶ 40 (Mar. 2012), http://events.ecowas.int/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/rapport-de-performance-201 1-EN.pdf. International organizations include
the European Union, African Development Bank, and the World Bank, while state donors include
Canada, Spain, France, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Venezuela, Cuba, Israel, China,

India, and Japan. Id.
224. ECOWAS Comm'n, Seventy Third Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, at 6 (Dec. 2014),
20
15/01/10-Work-Programme-2015-Institutionshttp://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/
Special-Programmes-etc.pdf.
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human treaties. Since Africa has a regional Freedom House score of 4.7,
meaning 12% free (out of a possible 100% free), 225 and individual African
states have a poor history of upholding human rights and civil liberties, it is
quite safe to assume that, annually, both the number of human rights
violations and potential complainants is very high. Yet, between 1987 and
2015, a total of only 337 human rights cases were adjudicated in the African
court system. These cases resulted in 113 judgments finding state violations
of the Charter. The existing data on state implementation of African court
system judgments, mostly focused on the ACommHPR, suggest that
compliance rates are poor. Moreover, studies outline numerous institutional
obstacles to compliance, both for the ACommHPR and at the state level.
Finally, the African court system is dependent on foreign donors for its
operation, and this funding model likely undermines the African court
system's independence, legitimacy, and effectiveness.
III.

THE FAILURE (OR SUCCESS) OF AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL COURTS

Is the African court system effective? Section II provides data on the
structure, caseload, state compliance rates, and funding of the African court
system. 226 These data, combined with the Viljoen and Louw findings and the
Murray and Long study, show that the state compliance rate with adverse
court judgments from the African court system is low, as states have fully or
partially implemented few of these judgments.227 Similarly, the African court
system's caseload is arguably very low in light of Africa's population, overall
level of state-driven violence, and poor human rights record. 228 With the
exception of the ECOWAS Court, the African court system is dependent on
bilateral, multilateral, and private financing from international, European, and
American donors, potentially undermining its legitimacy. 229 In light of the
metrics of effectiveness outlined in Section I and the data on the African court
system presented in Section II, it appears that the African court system is
struggling to be effective.

225. Sub-SaharanAfrica, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa

(last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
226. See supra Section II.
227. The Viljoen and Louw study was the most promising for state compliance rates, but as the
authors specifically recognized, its methodology was problematic in several places. Viljoen & Louw, supra
note 106.
228. Sub-SaharanAfrica, supra note 225.
229. See supra Section 11(D).
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A. Questioning the Data and Evaluaing Efectiveness
Along the dimension of case-specific effectiveness, the African court
system is facing significant challenges. However, as I noted in Section I, a
single study of the African court system focusing on only one form of
effectiveness cannot rule out the possibility that the African court system
performs better under a different measure. For example, one can argue that
other methodological approaches are more appropriate for evaluating
effectiveness, that practical constraints limit the African court system's
capacity, and that it is simply too early to assess a relatively new judicial
system. Below, I address the central critiques to the method applied in this
Article. While these critiques do not undermine the contention that the
African court system is struggling, they do illustrate the difficulties in
demonstrating if and how the African court system affects or contributes to
the state of human rights practices in Africa.
1.

Methodolog

The most straightforward critique is that the case-specific approach is the
wrong methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of the African court system,
or that it is the methodology least likely to produce a favorable assessment.
Since the case-specific approach is, by definition, heavily focused on cases,
one could argue that it misses the alternative mechanisms through which an
IC's judgment, even if not always or regularly implemented, shapes respect
for human rights within states.
One could argue that effectiveness is better conceptualized as
"observable, desired changes in behavior" among those actors subject to the
IC's authority, not necessarily compliance by the salient parties on a case-bycase level. 230 More concretely, a state might comply with the underlying legal
rationale of an IC's decision, even if the state does not formally comply with
a specific adverse judgment. Maybe "the real effectiveness test . . . is not
compliance but the counterfactual of what the outcome would have been
or perhaps even the IC's very
absent the IC."231 If the IC's judgment existence - generates a change in state behavior that deviates from the status
quo ex ante, then the IC could be viewed as effective.
Similarly, competing methodologies including erga omnes effectiveness,
which centers on the capacity of an IC to affect those subject to its
authority, 232 and embeddedness effectiveness, which focuses on the capacity
230. Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Efectiveness in InternationalRegulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES.

J. INT'L L. 387, 394 (2000).
231. Karen

J. Alter,

Agents or Trustees? InternationalCourts in their Political Context, 14 EUR.

REL.. 33, 52 (2008).
232. Helfer, supra note 29, at 472.
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of an IC to assist state actors to address human rights violations
domestically, 233 might capture an IC's influence on states in ways that
measuring case implementation at the national level cannot. In other words,
the case-specific approach and supporting data cannot formally disprove the
hypothesis that the African court system can influence states, improve state
human rights practices, and improve human rights outcomes on the ground.
It is certainly fair to argue that competing methodologies might produce
a different assessment of the African court system. There are many potential
avenues through which an IC could be effective, and no single study could
prove or disprove all the potential hypotheses about the effectiveness of the
African court system. The methodological strategy and data in this Article
cannot show that the African court system does not, at any point, have a
positive effect on human rights outcomes in Africa. Rather, this study
discusses examples of the few cases in which states have actually implemented
the ACommHPR's human rights judgments, and it points out the existing
obstacles to greater compliance. However, it is important to recognize that
neither the possibility of an effect nor the existence of a specific effect makes
the African court system generally effective overall. The key takeaway is that
a straightforward measure of IC effectiveness common to the international
law literature suggests that the African court system is underperforming along
several dimensions.
2.

Baseline Issues

Some might argue that counting cases, measuring implementation, and
drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of the African court system is
futile without a baseline against which to compare the court system's
performance. Since Africa has many states with serious human rights
problems, low Freedom House Scores, weak rule of law traditions, and high
levels of poverty, it would be unreasonable to expect the African court system
to have a large human rights caseload and a high compliance rate for its
judgments. The fact that the African court system has adjudicated 337 cases
and found 113 violations of the Charter is compelling for any court operating
under such constraints.
Questions about the appropriate baseline to evaluate legal rules,
institutional competencies, and judicial performance are endemic in law. In
this particular case, the baselines issue cuts both ways. On the one hand, one
could argue that it is unreasonable to expect the African court system in a few
short years to operate as a well-functioning regional and sub-regional
judiciary, adjudicating cases efficiently and enjoying high levels of compliance.
The poor governance, weak institutions, deep poverty, and ethnic strife
common to many African states are unlikely to be a solid foundation upon
233. Id. at 474.
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which a regional or sub-regional human rights system could flourish. Perfect
compliance is not possible in the world's most advanced legal systems, and it
should not be the measure of effectiveness in Africa.
On the other hand, it is also unreasonable for the baseline to be zero, or
something approaching it. For the African court system, there have been 113
judgments of violation over a twenty-seven-year period. Compliance rates are
difficult to ascertain, but the Viljoen and Louw study estimates that states
have partially or fully implemented 45% of ACommHPR's judgments. Even
under the assumption that this compliance rate is generalizable - and there
are good reasons to question that assumption - only forty-nine of the 133
judgments have been partially or fully implemented between 1988 and 2015.
While I agree that a fair baseline should not be 200 African court system
judgments partially or fully implemented annually, the current average is less
than two per year. It is hard to see how the African court system with this
record could be considered effective under the case-specific approach. One
might argue that it is effective given the challenges it faces, but one wonders
if the African court system is a useful tool to improve human rights outcomes
on the ground. Perhaps the underlying conditions necessary for the African
court system to be effective are absent or are still at a very early stage of
development. Whatever the baseline, two cases enforced annually seems
inadequate to show that the African court system is effective.
Another way of thinking about the appropriate baseline for assessing state
implementation is through the lens of the African court system's funding.
Rather than focusing on the obstacles to effectiveness in Africa, one might
argue that the African court system's dependence on foreign donors for its
operation, the role of international organizations in funding human rights
litigation, and the presence of African and international human rights groups
pushing for state compliance all suggest that the baseline should be higher
than two cases per year. After all, European, American, and African donors
have spent and continue to spend tens of millions of dollars to make the
African court system effective; like all of us, they want to see human rights
violators punished. Despite the millions of dollars of funding, caseloads are
small and judgments are infrequently enforced.
3.

IncentiviZng Domestic Courts

One could argue that the existence and operation of the African court
system has incentivized local actors to address human rights claims. Even if
its caseload is small, the very existence of the African court system catalyzes
domestic actors to pursue human rights claims that otherwise would not have
been brought. The African court system's low usage rate might be a sign that
state domestic courts have been more assertive in exercising jurisdiction over
human rights cases, with decisions enforced by local authorities. The African
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court system does not need an expansive caseload or a high compliance rate
to influence human rights practices in states.
It is conceivable that there has been an increase in human rights cases
adjudicated by domestic courts in Africa and that the increase, all else equal,
is causally related to the creation and operation of the African court system.
Similarly, it is possible that the number of human rights cases in the African
court system and domestic courts is low because African states are enforcing
national human rights laws. Of course, the data presented here cannot
disprove these hypotheses, and an evaluation of the domestic courts of fiftyfour African states is well beyond the scope of this Article. Yet, in light of the
evidence that we do have - a poor Freedom House score for Africa, few
cases, and even fewer decisions enforced - it is unlikely that domestic courts
have been adjudicating the "missing" human rights cases that we would
expect to see in Africa.
As a threshold matter, national judiciaries in African states rarely cite to
international agreements, including the Charter. They also have very little
knowledge of the operation and judgments of the ACommHPR. 234 This fact
by itself undermines the claim that the ACommHPR's judgments might
catalyze domestic courts to hear more human rights cases, when those courts
do not even know about the ACommHPR's activities. For example, "There
have been no reported cases of reliance on the findings of the African
Commission or human rights treaty bodies in the case law of African
Francophone countries." 235 To further the point, below is a brief description
of the domestic legal status of international human rights law in a few African
national courts.
Like other regions of the world, African states have different
constitutional procedures governing the application and enforcement of
international human rights treaties within their domestic legal systems. Some
states are monist in that they permit international law and treaties to serve as
a basis for a claim without requiring any domestic implementing legislation. 236
Some are dualist and require, but do not often pass, the legislation necessary
to permit human rights claims by individuals. Others permit the citation of
international law in their constitutional jurisprudence, but only as persuasive
rather than binding authority. 237 Finally, some states simply ignore
international human rights commitments in treaties that they have signed and
to which they are parties. 238

234. MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, at 94.
235. INTERNATIONAL. LAW AND DOMEsTIc RIGHTS LITIGATION IN AFRICA 8 (Magnus Killander

ed. 2010).
236. VILJOEN, stpranote 138, at 548.

237. Id at 522.
238. Id. at 109.
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Moving to specific African countries, Benin appears to open its domestic
239
although
courts to human rights claims based on violations of the ACHPR,
the Benin Constitutional Court generally understands international treaties to
enhance rights that are already protected in Benin's constitution. 240 Similarly,
the Botswana Court of Appeal does not rely on international human rights
law for its decisions, but it has occasionally referred to human rights treaties
as persuasive authority in cases in which the underlying human rights law was
241
The Democratic Republic of the
consistent with Botswana's domestic law.
provisions in treaties to be
rights
human
international
considers
Congo
neither as persuasive nor
treated
are
provisions
such
informative, but
242
Ghana has sometimes permitted constitutional claims based on or
binding.
influenced by provisions of the Charter, while in other cases national courts
243
have ignored international human rights treaties.
The Lesotho Court of Appeal has permitted individual human rights
claims based on obligations enshrined in UN-sponsored international human
rights treaties, and it has treated regional human rights agreements as legally
binding. 244 However, Lesotho does not treat such agreements - international
as automatically self-executing within its domestic legal
or regional system. 245 Malawi is somewhat similar in that it treats the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") as binding law and permits human
rights claims in domestic courts. 246 Interestingly, in Malawi, regional
agreements like the Charter only constitute persuasive authority in domestic
cases.

247

Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa are among the African states
with the most permissive regimes for international human rights claims in
their respective domestic courts. Namibia ratified and adopted as binding
domestic law the Charter, the UDHR, and the ICCPR. The national courts of
Namibia permit individuals to bring claims based on violations of the UDHR
248
Nigeria generally treats the Charter
and the two international agreements.

239. Id.
240. See Anna Rotman, Benin's ConstitutionalCour:An InstitutionalModelfor GuaranteeingHuman Rights,

17 HARV. HUM. RTs.J. 281 (2004).
241. VILJOEN, supra note 138.
242. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 546 (1st ed. 2007)

Ihereinafter VILJOEN (1st ed. 2007)].
243. VILJOEN, supra note 138, at 531.
244. Id. at 532.
245. Id
246. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 1994, MALAWI GAZrTTE supp. 1994-05-16, No. 3C,

art. 15.
247. VILJOEN (1st ed. 2007), supra note 242, at 548.
248. VILJOEN, supra note 138, at 532.
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provisions as binding law in its national courts, although it is unclear whether
Nigeria considers international treaties binding in national courts as well.249
Senegal and South Africa are less clear about the legal status of
international human rights treaties in national courts and whether such
treaties serve as a basis for a private right of action. Senegal appears to
consider the Charter and other international treaties directly applicable in
Senegalese courts without implementing legislation, but, in practice,
Senegalese courts treat them as persuasive authority rather than as an
independent basis for remediable claim. 250 South Africa also treats the
ACHPR and other international human rights treaties as persuasive legal
authority,251 although it is not clear if they serve as a basis for a claim. 252 The
South African Constitutional Court has held that they should be directly
applicable in South African courts without domestic implementing legislation,
but the record is unclear. 253
In Tanzania 254 and Uganda, 255 it appears that international human rights
treaties do not have persuasive authority - let alone binding authority - and
do not serve as a basis of a claim or legal remedy in their respective national
courts. For example, Gathii notes that "[t]he place of human rights, the rule
of law, and democracy within [Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Uganda] is still in its formative stage." 256 Unsurprisingly, Zimbabwean
national courts have issued decisions that squarely conflict with human rights
obligations in international human rights treaties that Zimbabwe has formally
ratified. 257
It is not clear from the varied constitutional procedures and practices
outlined above that there is reason to believe that African national courts are
adjudicating the "missing" denominator of potential human rights claims.
Whether the African court system could catalyze improved human rights
enforcement by domestic courts is an open question, but the lack of
knowledge about the ACommHPR and its operations by domestic courts, for
example, is not promising evidence.

249. Id. at 533.
250. Id. at 537.

251. Id. at 539.
252. Id. at 540.
253. Id. at 538.
254. Killander, supra note 235, at 57.

255. Id. at 83.
256. Gathii, supra note 7, at 261.
257. See generaly VJLJOEN, supra note 138.
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PracticalConstraints

-

The meager caseload of African court system might be explained by the
severe resource constraints - lack of information, access, and time - that
the victims of human rights violations face in pursuing a claim. The literacy
258
and the average
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is approximately 60% for adults,
African court
the
of
operation
and
existence
the
of
aware
be
not
might
person
human rights
a
of
victim
average
the
importantly,
system. Or, perhaps more
vindicate her
to
vehicle
preferred
the
as
litigation
violation might not envisage
rights. The average victim is unlikely to have the financial resources to pursue
litigation in domestic courts, let alone a distant African regional or subregional court, on a continent with an annual GNI per capita hovering around
$1,600. 259 For example, ACommHPR's requirements to exhaust local
260
remedies only increase the financial and temporal costs of bringing a claim.
Similarly, some of the courts in the African court system are
geographically difficult for potential litigants to access. The ACommHPR
the quasi-judicial body whose cases comprise the vast majority of the dataset
- is based in Banjul, Gambia, which is far removed from population centers
in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Egypt. The ACommHPR does not hear cases on a
regularized basis and generally meets only twice a year, 261 hiting
opportunities for victims to get their day in court. From a temporal
perspective, it could take years between the date of the alleged human rights
violation and the opportunity to present one's case before the ACommHPR.
Once local remedies are exhausted, a process that often runs into indefinite
delays in corrupt legal systems, many of the courts within the African court
system take years to issue decisions. Even if a complainant is successful with
262
her claim before a court, implementation is unlikely.

There is no question that the practical constraints outlined above hugely
affect the ability of litigants to pursue human rights claims and, as a
consequence, reduce the caseload of the African court system. Potential
litigants already carry the scars of the human rights violations they have
suffered, and it is perhaps unreasonable to expect many to overcome the
numerous practical obstacles to vindicating their claims. Perhaps
paradoxically, the severity of the resource constraints described actually
suggests that the African court system has enormous impediments to
overcome before it can become a serious option for the typical human rights
victim of abuse, let alone an effective mechanism to address human rights
258. UIS FACT SHEET 3, UNESCO INST. FOR STAT., ADULT & YOUTH LITERACY (2015),
2 2

http://www.uis.unesco.org/iteracy/Documents/fs3 - 015-literacy.pdf.
259. Sub-Saharan Africa, WBG (2016), http://data.worldbank.org/region/SSA.
260.2 ACOMMHPR, INFORMATION SHEET 8, ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, http://www.achpr.org/files/

pages/communications/guidelines/achpr-infosheetcommunications-eng.pdf.
261. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, INT'L SERV. FOR HUM. RTS. (July 8, 2008),
http://www.isht.ch/news/african-commission-human-and-peoples-rights-article.

262. See supra Section I1(C)(1), at 21-27.
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violations. Deep poverty and its attendant consequences on health and
educational outcomes for many Africans are unlikely to be addressed soon,
meaning that the practical constraints that have limited the African court
system's effectiveness for the past twenty-seven years will continue.

B. JudicialMaturity
Another explanation concerns the relative maturity of the African court
system. One might contend that twenty-seven years is simply not enough time
for the African court system to establish its legal authority. The ACommHPR
has been operational since 1987,263 but the EACJ and ECOWAS Court, for
example, have only been adjudicating human rights claims for a little over ten
years. 264 Maybe it is too early to assess the African court system because it
does not have a developed history of adjudicating human rights claims, and
African states have not created the domestic enforcement infrastructure to
implement judgments. If this is accurate, perhaps we should expect to see low
numbers of adjudicated claims in the early years of the African court system,
with an increasing caseload over time.
The data presented in Section II do indicate an uptick in adjudicated
cases by the African court system over the second half of its existence. 265 It is
certainly possible that over another twenty-seven-year period, the African
court system will mature in conjunction with national judiciaries, resulting in
higher levels of state compliance and, hopefully, lower levels of human rights
violations. The data from the last thirteen years is supportive of this potential
outcome, although there are also countervailing factors, such as poverty.
One comparative data point is the caseload of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights ("IACHR")266 and the European Court of Human Rights
("ECtHR")267 during their first ten years of existence. A direct comparison of
the ACommHPR's current caseload with that of the IACHR and ECtHR
would be almost entirely useless, as the IACHR and the ECtHR are twentyeight and forty-eight years older respectively, meaning that the latter two
263. AboutACHPR, ACOMMHPR, http://www.achpr.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
264. Alter et al., supra note 5, at 737; Dr. John Eudes Ruhangisa, EACJ Registrar, A Paper for
Presentation During the Sensitisation Workshop on the Role of the EACJ in the EAC Integration: The
East African Court ofJustice: Ten Years of Operation (Achievements and Challenges), (Nov. 1-2,2011),

http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/EACJ-Ten-Years-of-Operation.pdf.

265. See supra Figure 4.
266. The IACHR was founded in 1979 and is based in San Jose, Costa Rica. It consists of a tribunal
of seven members and meets regularly. It has jurisdiction over all twenty-nine member states of the
Organization of American States. See generally Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-Amencin Court of Human

Rights, 76 AM. J INT'L L. 231 (1982).
267. The ECtHR was founded in 1959 and is based in Strasbourg, France. It consists of a tribunal
of forty-seven members and meets regularly. It has jurisdiction over all forty-seven member states of the
Council of Europe. See generally Alona E. Evans, European Court ofHuman Rights, 61 AM. J INT'L L. 1075
(1967); EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home (last visited Feb. 18,
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regional courts have had many more years to mature, adjudicate claims, and
develop a human rights jurisprudence. Moreover, any comparison cannot
account for the sheer number of confounding variables at the regional level,
including FH scores, population and GDP, rule of law tradition, availability
of national courts for human rights claims, and frequency of war. That said,
the ECtHR and the IACHR are the only regional human rights courts against
which we can compare the ACommHPR.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the ACommHPR caseload is
somewhat comparable to the ECtHR over the first ten years - ninety-one

for the ACommHPR to 122 for the ECtHR -

but is well behind the

IACHR's 201 cases. Although this evidence seems promising, it is important
to note that the comparison is between the ACommHPR and two regional
courts, rather than one between the ACourtHPR and the ECtHR and
IACHR. This is the most favorable comparison for the judicial maturity
argument, since ACourtHPR's twenty cases adjudicated over its first ten years
is a much smaller number than the ACommHPR's ninety-one cases. Whether
these data support or undermine the judicial maturity argument, however, is
unclear. To prove such a claim would require a much more exhaustive
investigation. The trend seems positive, but the sample size is small, and,
effect on state
given the difficulties in obtaining data on implementation, the
compliance is unknown.
As is clear by now, this study employs the case-specific method to assess
the effectiveness of the African court system. Using the criteria common to
this approach, it appears that the African court system is struggling to be
effective, although there is variation in the effectiveness and future potential
of the regional and sub-regional courts within it. This section engages several
conceptual, methodical, and practical critiques. These critiques certainly
cannot disprove the possibility that a different quantitative or qualitative
methodology might indicate that the African court system is effective. Still,
the evidence adduced here suggests that over the short- to medium-term, the
African court system faces significant challenges to establishing its authority
and functioning as an effective adjudicator of human rights claims.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN COURT SYSTEM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS CLAIMS

The comprehensive studies of the structure and operation of the
ACommHPR and the sub-regional courts that comprise the African court
system show that there are significant institutional, procedural, and
operational challenges that limit the effectiveness of the African court system.
Moreover, at the state level, the lack of knowledge about the ACommHPR,
the non-binding treatment of ACommHPR judgments and international law
in national judiciaries of African states, and the weight of the available state
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compliance data suggest that African states are not regularly enforcing African
court system judgments. Finally, the enormity of the practical constraints
obstructing the ability of victims of human rights violations to access the
African court system serve to reduce the African court system's already small
caseload and restrict its capacity to influence human rights outcomes on the
ground. Issues at every level - the regional and sub-regional courts, national
courts, and individual victims of human rights violations - limit the African
court system's capacity to act as an effective adjudicator of human rights
claims.
These significant challenges do not mean, however, that efforts should
not be made to improve the African court system. If meaningful proposals
for reform exist and will likely lead to better human rights outcomes in Africa,
they should be funded and implemented. Below, I briefly summarize some of
the more prominent proposals to improve the operation of the African court
system. What is clear from the proposals is that little will change unless the
AU demonstrates that it has the political will to address the African court
system's problems. To begin assessing political will, this section concludes by
discussing recent developments in the position of the AU and individual
African states toward the African court system, the ICC, and human rights
claims in general.
A. Normative Proposalsto Improve the African Court System
In their study of the ACommHPR, Murray and Long outline a series of
normative proposals to improve the ACommHPR's operation, provide
human rights organizations and other concerned NGOs with greater access
to ACommHPR hearings, and ensure that states implement the
ACommHPR's decisions. 268 For example, Murray and Long suggest that the
ACommHPR judges improve the quality of the legal reasoning in their
judgments, including specifying clearly their recommendations and remedies
for states in violation of the Charter. 269 This, in turn, would theoretically make
it harder for states to ignore or otherwise circumvent the ACommHPR's
authority.
Murray and Long strongly endorse a more vigorous ACommHPR followup procedure to verify that states are complying with its decisions. This
includes engaging in promotional missions and expanding the role of Special
RapporteurS 270 to pressure states to comply with ACommHPR judgments. 271
While strengthening national judiciaries and legislatures is important, Murray
268.
269.
270.
271.

MURRAY & LONG, supra note 12, ch. 6.

Id at 112-14.
Id. at 127-128.
Id. ch. 6.
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and Long also encourage national human rights institutions ("NHRIs") "to
272
civil society activists to "apply
facilitate the process of implementation,"
273
and the UNDP to assist in
pressure on States to implement [judgments],"
making sure that "the African Commission's findings can be disseminated
among national actors."274
Since the ACourtHPR can issue legally binding decisions, Murray and
Long propose that the ACommHPR transfer cases of state non-compliance
to the ACourtHPR for review. However, Murray and Long are skeptical that
this would improve compliance, and they lament the absence of AU guidance
275
on how the two bodies should coordinate. Murray and Long argue that the
AU's political organs must take steps to ensure state compliance by making
the ACommHPR's judgments legally binding, 276 imposing sanctions in
serious cases, 277 and engaging more directly in debates about implementation
with the ACommHPR itself.278 Finally, they call for greater funding - always
of the ACommHPR and the
a concern, as Section II illustrates ACourtHPR. Doing so will remedy operational and programmatic deficits,
increase the number of full-time staff, and expand the human rights
caseload. 279
All of these normative proposals address important institutional,
procedural, and structural problems at the ACommHPR and the
ACourtHPR, and, if fully implemented, are likely to improve these courts'
general effectiveness. However, Murray and Long acknowledge that the core
issue is whether the political will exists among the AU's member states to take
meaningful steps to ensure that the ACommHPR's judgments are
implemented.280 In light of the enormous practical challenges facing the
African court system outlined in Sections III, changes in the institutional
design of the ACommHPR and the ACourtHRP - without the political will
of states to enforce judgments - are unlikely to improve their effectiveness.
B. The AU's History with Regional and InternationalCourts
Whatever the extant structural, institutional, and economic shortcomings
of the African court system, its future turns on the political will of the AU
member states. To provide just one example, an improvement in their
collective willingness to comply with judgments could elevate the importance
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 105.
Id at 109.
Id. at 111.
Id at 160.
Id. at 174.
Id at 175
Id. at 176.
Id. at 131-32.
Id at 139.
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of the African court system and signal to domestic and international
constituencies that human rights matter. Assessing the political will of the
entire AU is extremely complicated and well beyond the scope of this Article.
One way to make progress on this important question, however, is to explore
the history and politics behind the AU's creation of the ACourtHPR and the
ACJHR and to examine the AU's relationship with the ICC. Since these three
courts have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over human rights claims in
Africa, their interaction with the AU will provide some insight on the AU's
political will to enforce human rights claims.
1.

African Court ofJustice andHuman Rights and the ICC

Although the ACommHPR has been in existence since 1988, the
ACourtHPR was established by a Protocol to the Charter that was adopted
on June 10, 1998, and entered into force on January 25, 2004.281 During the
same period, the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union
("CJAU") created the Court of Justice of the African Union, which was
adopted on July 11, 2003, but did not enter into force until February 11,
2009. 282 The AU apparently contemplated two functioning courts: the
ACourtHPR with specialized jurisdiction over human rights claims and the
CJAU with general jurisdiction over AU matters. As the data show, the
ACommHPR continued to investigate claims of human rights violations and
issued judgments throughout this period.
However, on July 1, 2008, the AU adopted the Protocol on the Statute of
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights ("Protocol"), which merged
the ACourtHPR with the not yet operational CJAU to create the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights ("ACJHR'D. 283 Per the Protocol, the
ACJHR will have two sections: a General Affairs section and a Human Rights
section, each composed of eight judges. 284 The actual merger has not occurred
because the Protocol has not yet entered into force. Further, as of March 2,
2014 (at this writing, the most recent date that the AU website has updated
the ratification list), only five states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Libya, and
Mali) had ratified the Protocol. 285

281. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an

African

Court,

June

10,

1998,

OAU

Doc.

OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(II),

http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/. The Draft Protocol, which was adopted
unmodified, is reprintedin 9 AFR.J. INT'L& COMP. L. 953.
282. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court, supra note 281; Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, July 11, 2003,

reprinted in 113 AFR.J. INT'L& COMP. L. 115 (2005) (entered into force Feb. 11, 2009).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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On the one hand, this story of competing courts, overlapping
jurisdictions, and a merger-in-progress might suggest that the AU is struggling
to design and operationalize what will eventually be Africa's main regional
court. In perhaps the best example of operational difficulties, the AU formally
merged the CJAU with the ACourtHPR in 2008, before the protocol creating
the CJAU even entered into force in 2009.286 Since the product of the merger
- the ACJHR - is not yet operational, the AU has two courts that were

formally dissolved on paper but still function in practice. Meanwhile, the
ACommHPR continues to hear human rights claims, but its formal
relationship with the new ACJHR is, to date, unclear.
On the other hand, one could argue that the AU is trying to determine
the appropriate institutional design to address human rights claims.
Centralizing judicial authority in one court, the ACJHR, rather than having
two courts with jurisdiction over a range of claims, might optimize limited
judicial resources. Also, the AU has continued to support the ACommHPR

-

and its human rights mandate during the broader reorganization. In short,
while the AU might be moving slowly to design an effective African regional
court with the capacity to address violations of the Charter, the political will
is there, even if progress is incremental.
In fact, the AU's June 27, 2014, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights ("The
287
The Malabo Protocol
Malabo Protocol"), seems to support this contention.
and structure of the
jurisdiction
the
to
changes
important
of
a
number
makes
jurisdiction
criminal
with
ACJHR
the
still nascent ACJHR. First, it provides
crimes
four
over fourteen international crimes, 288 well beyond the
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression
289
As part of the
within the ICC's jurisdiction under the Rome Statute.
creates a third
Protocol
Malabo
the
jurisdiction,
ACJHR's
expansion of the

286. AU Assembly Dec. 196 (Xl), 11th Ordinary Sess., at 13 (June 30-July 1, 2008),
https://www.au.int/web/en/decisions/assembly-african-union-eleventh-orcdnary-session.
287. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of justice and

Human Rights, June 27,

2014, https://au.int/web/sites/default/fltes/treaies/7804-treaty-0045_-

protocol on-amendments-to-the-protocol on_the-statute oftheaftican-court-of-justiceand-h
uman.rights-e.pdf 1hereinafter Malabo Protocol].
288. In addition to the four crimes that are also part of the ICC's jurisdiction, the ACJHR has
jurisdiction over the following ten crimes: unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism,
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in
hazardous wastes, and the illicit exploitation of natural resources. See Amnesty Int'l, Malabo Protocol:Iegal

and InstitutionalImplications of the Merged and ExpandedAfrican Court, AFR 01/3063/2016, at 5 (Jan. 22,
2016), availableat http://www.refworld.org/docid/56a9ddcf4.html.
289. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 5-8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 |hereinafter
Rome Statute].
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section for international crimes apart from the human rights and general
affairs sections already envisaged. 290
Second, the Malabo Protocol provides for corporate criminal liability for
serious crimes, an expansion of criminal liability absent in other international
human rights treaties. 291 Third, it creates a "Defence Office," akin to an
Office of Public Defender, as an independent organ of the ACJHR. 292

Through the Malabo Protocol, the AU has vested the ACJHR with formal
authority to issue legally binding judgments and has granted the ACJHR the
most expansive human rights and international criminal jurisdiction of any
existing court, including the ICC. Despite the fitful beginning, the Malabo
Protocol perhaps suggests that the AU is finally serious about addressing
human rights violations. Viewed in this light, one could argue that the AU is
beginning to show the political will to address human rights violations.
The story, however, is not as simple as it seems. A deeper examination of
the politics surrounding the Malabo Protocol suggests that the AU began to
conceptualize an "African Court" to address human rights violations in
response to the ICC's apparent targeting of Africans for international criminal
prosecution since the ICC came into existence in 2002.293 The AU and several
member states have repeatedly condemned the ICC as "racist" and "antiAfrican," 294 arguing that the ICC is only interested in applying "Western
justice." 295 Others have simply called it "biased." 296 For many, the ICC's
selective caseload proves the point: "Despite having received almost 9,000
formal complaints about alleged war crimes in at least 139 countries, the ICC
has focused exclusively on Africa, choosing to indict thirty-six black Africans
290. Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice
and Human Rights, art. 16, 2014, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/African CourtProtocol_-

-July-2014.pdf.
291. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 17-18, Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 405480, at *17-*18;
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer
ed. 2008); Albin Eser, IndihidualCnminalReponsibility,in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 778-79 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002).

292. Amended ACJHR Statute, art. 22C(1)-(2).
293. Max du Plessis, Tiyanjana Maluwa & Annie O'Reilly, Afnca and the International Crminal
Court,
CHATAM HOUSE INT'L L. 2 (2013), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/
Research/Internaional/`2OLaw/0713ppiccafrica.pdf (claiming that all ICC investigations involve
alleged violations in Africa).

294. Barry Malone, Africans Push UN to Call Off "Racist" Court, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 15, 2013, 16:00
GMT),

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/africans-push-un-call-off-racist-court-

2013111451110131757.htm.
295. See general# AFP, Gbagbo Trial Rekindles Controvery in Africa Over Western justice, DAILY MAIL

(Jan.

28,

2016,

7:40 AM),

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wites/afp/article-3420356/Gbagbo-trial-

rekindles-controversy-Africa-western-justice.html; Obianuju Okafor, ICC Trialoflaurent Gbagbo Rekindles
WesternJusiceArgument, ANSWERS AFR., http://answersafrica.com/icc-trial-of-laurent-gbagbo-rekindleswestern-justice-argument.html.
296. Malone, sspranote 294.
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in eight African countries." 297 After the ICC indicted Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta in 2012, the AU began to consider withdrawing, en masse,
from the ICC, and, in 2013, the AU formally announced "that no serving AU
Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such
capacity, shall be required to appear before any international court or tribunal
298
during his term of office."
To that end, for African leaders and senior officials accused of human
rights violations from prosecution by the ACJHR, the Malabo Protocol
specifically immunizes them while they are in office - an immunity that the
299
One might argue that this form of head of state
ICC does not recognize.
immunity might encourage greater cooperation with the ACJHR on the
theory that sitting African leaders would not have to worry about prosecution.
However, such immunity also creates the perverse incentive for African
leaders accused of human rights violations to stay in office and try to preserve
their immunity for life. Despite the ACJHR's broad human rights mandate
and expansive international criminal jurisdiction, the AU may very well have
strategically extended the AJCHR's authority to ensure that any human rights
violations allegedly committed by an African leader will fall under the
AJCHR's jurisdiction, conceivably making it harder for the ICC to exercise
300
Although the ICC would not be
concurrent jurisdiction over the accused.
formally prohibited from pursuing an international criminal prosecution of an
African leader, the political costs of indicting an African head of state already
subject to the authority of an African court might be too high, especially in
light of the ICC's already fractured relationship with the AU.
Notably, the ACJHR's broad jurisdiction over fourteen international
crimes will likely generate a large caseload in light of Africa's poor human
rights record. Supporting the ACJHR's potential caseload would require more
judges, staff, and trials, not to mention the provision of public defenders for
the accused. Given the chronic underfunding of the African court system and
(July 29,
297. David Hoile, The InternationalCriminalCourtis Unfitfor Purpose, MIDDLE E. MONITOR
89
-the-internationalhttps://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/200
AM),
11:26
2015,
criminal-court-is-unfit-for-purpose/.
298. Tom Maliti, AU Asks Kenyatta Not to Attend Trial Until DeferralRequest is Acted On, INT'LJUST.
0
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2 13/10/au-asks-kenyatta-not-to-attend-trial-until-deferralMONITOR,
request-is-acted-on/.
299. Malabo Protocol, supra note 287, art. 46A; Rome Statute, supra note 289, art. 27.
300. See Rome Statute, supra note 289, art. 98(2) (prohibiting the ICC from requesting surrender or
assistance that would require a member to act inconsistently with obligations under international
agreements); Max du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction over
International Crimes, INST. FOR SEC. STUDI ES (2012), https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/
site/uploads/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf. Some have described this as a negative complementarity. See
Max du Plessis, A Case ofNegative RegionalComplementarity? Giving the African Court ofjustice andHuman Rights
Jurisdiction over International Crimes, EJ1L: TALK! (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-case-ofnegative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-jurisdictonover-international-crimes/.
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the AU's reliance on European donors, it is not clear how the AU will fund
the ACJHR's new, expansive mandate. 301 A comparison of the ICC's and the
ACourtHPR's budgets is instructive:
In 2011 the AU's budget for the 2011 financial year amounted to US

$256,754.447. Included in that amount was a total allocation for the
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights of US $9,389,615.
Compare that with the ICC. In the same year the ICC had a budget
of US $134 million, $26 million short of what it says it needed for
2012. The point is that the ICC budget - currently for investigating
just three crimes, and not the raft of offences the African Court is
expected to tackle - is more than 14 times that of the African Court
without a criminal component; and is just about double the entire
budget of the AU.302
If the AU wants the ACJHR to operate effectively, the AU will have to fund
it at unprecedented levels, well beyond the existing capacity of member
states. 303
From the discussion above, it is difficult to conclude that the AU has
shown the political will to adjudicate and prosecute human rights claims
against member states. On paper, the AU has granted the ACJHR the most
extensive jurisdiction to hear human rights claims and issue legally binding
judgments of any other regional court. The ACJHR even surpasses the ICC
in its authority to prosecute international crimes. At the same time, the AU
provides immunity to heads of state and other senior officials accused of
human rights violations - creating perverse incentives for leaders in power
- and the ACJHR has the potential to complicate the ICC's capacity to
prosecute African leaders. 304 Based on the AU's current funding model, it is
not clear that the ACJHR would ever get the necessary funding to adjudicate
what would likely be an increased volume of human rights cases. In short, the
AU still has not demonstrated the requisite political will to make its
commitment to human rights a reality on the ground.
2. African (or European) Courtsfor Africans?
One important justification for the creation of the AJCHR was the AU's
desire to have Africans - not the ICC or other foreigners - solve African
human rights problems. The AJCHR would lead to African judges applying
an African Charter in African courts to cases involving African parties and
enforced by African states. For many in the AU, the ICC's targeting of
Africans eroded its legitimacy and contributed to the view that the ICC is a
301. See supra Section IV(B)(2).
302. Plessis, A Case ofNegative Regional Complementariy?, supra note 300.

303. Id.
304. Malabo Protocol, supra note 287.
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tool of Europeans rather than an impartial international tribunal. Whatever
its merits -

and the good intentions of many involved with it -

the ICC has

been damaged by the perception of foreign meddling in African affairs.
A similar perception of foreign involvement applies to the African court
system. As the funding data show, nearly all of the courts (with the exception
of the ECOWAS Court) rely on outside donors. Foreign states, aid agencies,
and human rights organizations play a significant role in financing the
litigation. Although the African court system's judges are African, many of
305
According to
the key staff - including legal officers - are foreign as well.
Lee Stone:
and
ACommHPR,
at
the
intern
an
Max du Plessis, who served as
The African Commission has become synonymous with young
European, American and Canadian interns who undertake a
perfunctory six-month stint in The Gambia, to "help Africa." As
altruistic and as valuable as this is, it serves to confirm how deprived
the Commission is of African graduates who might similarly enhance
their professional careers through an internship at the Commission
and whose own home-grown experience might benefit the
306
Commission's work on African soil.

While there are good reasons to admire foreign states and aid agencies for
their commitment to fighting human rights violations in Africa, the African
court system's dependence on foreign donors might compromise its
legitimacy. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that this is a growing
problem. For example, in 2008, the AU increased the budgetary allocation to
the ACommHPR by over 400% to $6,003,857.307 According to the twentythird AU Activity Report, this large increase was designed "to facilitate the
Commission's effective implementation of its mandate; to remove the
Commission's reliance on donorfunding andto ensure that the Commission is seen as being
independent." 308 In 2014, the SADC Executive Secretary encouraged member
states to reduce donor reliance: "As long as donor contributions are the major
source of our funding, it will be hard for us to independently realise our
objectives - without pandering to the whims of others. This disturbing
309
Although these perspectives are
situation requires immediate attention."
between the desire of African
tension
the
simply illustrative, they highlight
judges and government officials to address human rights violations in Africa

-

305. Max du Plessis & Lee Stone, A Court Not Found?, 7 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 522, 533 (2007).
306. Id. at 533-34.
307. AU Assembly EX.CL/446(XIII), Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Submitted in Conformity with Article 54 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
23
2 3
Rights, at 7 (June 28, 2008), http://www.achpr.org/files/activity-reports/23/achpr4 4 eo4_actrep
20072008_eng.pdf.
308. Id (emphasis added).
309. 'Reduce Dependence on Donor Funding"-SADC Urged, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY. (July 24, 2014),
http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/reduce-dependence-donor-funding-sadc-urged/.

582

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 56:3

and the realization that doing so might require reliance on foreign donors who
at times may hold different conceptions on how to reach similar goals.

International human rights law and the African court system are logical
tools to fight human rights violations and vindicate civil liberties. Although
the African court system is struggling to be effective at this stage of its
development, this Article does not argue that the African court system is
completely ineffective, nor does it exclude the possibility that the other
approaches to measuring effectiveness discussed in Section I might generate
different results. Case-specific effectiveness is important, but there may also
be good normative, discursive, or symbolic reasons to have courts adjudicate
claims involving gross human rights atrocities, even if decisions are not
regularly enforced against the state perpetrators. Finally, this Article neither
claims that all aid for courts is unhelpful, nor that development aid is better.
Rather, it argues that in light of the performance of the African court system
so far, scholars, advocates, and donor states should reconsider how to allocate
limited resources to ensure that human rights outcomes improve, whether
through courts or other mechanisms.
CONCLUSION

The African court system consisting of the ACommHPR, the
ACourtHPR, the ECOWAS Court, the SADCT, and the EACJ - has
adjudicated 337 human rights cases over the past twenty-seven years, resulting
in 113 judgments of violation. Since 2009, the ACommHPR and the
ACourtHPR have spent $104 million to adjudicate human rights claims and
have heard eighty-eight cases, with twenty-four resulting in judgments of
violation, for an average cost of $1.2 million per case, or $4.3 million per
violation. Based on the best available data and academic studies, state
compliance has been poor, and few judgments have been enforced. Over the
last eight years, the AU has created the ACJHR - the successor to the
ACourtHPR and the CJAU - with a broad mandate to hear international
crimes and human rights violations. However, the ACJHR controversially
provides head of state immunity and might complicate the work of the ICC,
for better or worse. Finally, the African court system's reliance on outside
donors impacts perceptions of its independence, and so funding will be a
significant challenge to the ACJHR's eventual operation.
Simply because the African court system faces challenges today does not
mean that it cannot be effective in the future. One might argue that the
relative cost of the African court system is low, that it will likely strengthen
over time, and that retaining and improving a struggling court system is much
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better than the adverse signal that eliminating it would send. On its face, this
argument is completely plausible: maybe, over time, the ACJHR will
adjudicate an increasing number of cases, funding will similarly improve, and
African states will eventually implement adverse legal judgments and respect
human rights law. That is certainly a much-desired goal, one that almost all
would embrace. The real question is whether the available evidence supports
such optimism in light of the time, money, and opportunity cost of investing
hundreds of millions of dollars in a system that hears few cases, generates
even fewer violations, and sees a low percentage of its judgments
implemented. One worries that the African court system might actually hinder
human rights goals because it confirms the fragility of human rights law in

Africa, rather than promote the belief that pursuing human rights claims in
courts is a meaningful way to remedy violations. On the basis of this study on
one dimension of effectiveness, the African court system is struggling to be
effective in adjudicating cases and improving human rights outcomes in
Africa.
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